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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050461-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty 
pleas to burglary, a second degree felony, and aggravated assault, a second degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault, where the record 
establishes that defendant understood both the elements of the crime 
and the factual basis for it? 
IL Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea to burgary of a dwelling, where defendant waived his 
claims when he entered his plea? 
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas based on counsel's failure to advise him of an 
intoxication defense where nothing in the record indicates that counsel was 
aware of defendant's alleged intoxication? 
"[This Court] review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the 'clearly erroneous' standard for 
the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Smit, 
2004 UT App 222, f 7, 95 P.3d 1203 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request 
for substitute counsel, where defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel 
arose solely from counsel's unwillingness to assert frivolous claims? 
"'[W]hether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent defendant who expresses 
dissatisfaction with the court-appointed counsel... is a matter committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.'" State v. 
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 
272 (Utah App. 1987)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2004) (general statutory definitions 
applicable to criminal code); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (aggravated assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (West 2004) (statutory definitions 
applicable to burglary); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004) (burglary); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (West 2004) (burglary of a vehicle); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004) (plea withdrawal statute); 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI and Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (right to counsel); 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV and Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (due process). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 2004, defendant was charged by information with one count of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; one count of theft by receiving stolen property, 
a third degree felony; six counts of theft by receiving stolen property, a class A 
misdemeanor; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor 
(R. 1-5). The information contained the following probable cause statement summarizing 
the evidence upon which defendant's charges were based: 
1. On or about September 22, 2004[,] officers were dispatched to a 
burglary in progress in the neighborhood of 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, 
Sandy[,] Utah, Salt Lake County. 
2. T. and J. Ford heard noises outside their residence. J. Ford observed 
a[] vehicle parked just [n]orth of their driveway. T, Ford went outside to 
investigate the disturbance. T. Ford, with his opened hand[,] slapped the 
windshield of his motor home. The male defendant, JOSHUA SHUMAN 
HALE[,] was discovered inside. The male defendant, startled, popped his 
head up[,] looking at the victim. 
3. As the male defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE attempted to exit 
the motor home, T. Ford slammed the door shut. The male defendant 
forced his way out of the motor home, slammed T. Ford to the ground, 
punching and kicking victim T. Ford numerous times. 
4. A subsequent medical evaluation has revealed the following injuries 
sustained by the victim at the hands of the defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN 
HALE[:] a torn rotator cuff to the victim[']s left shoulder and a fracture to 
the victim[']s left elbow. 
5. The defendant fled on foot to the [s]outh. The female defendant,... 
who was sitting in the vehicle parked to the [n]orth of the driveway, sped 
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away. The female defendant stopped to pick up the foot fleeing male 
defendant. 
6. The victim T. Ford was able to observe the out of state license plate 
of the get-away car. Officers were then able to locate that vehicle in the 
area. The female defendant... was immediately apprehended and once 
again the male defendant, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE[,] was able to flee on 
foot against officer's verbal commands and elude apprehension. 
7. Subsequent investigation revealed that defendant JOSHUA 
SHUMAN HALE[,] while inside the motorhome[,] prepared various piles 
of goods he had gathered from throughout the motor home before being 
interrupted. 
8. Subsequent inventory search of the get-away car revealed several 
other stolen goods. [The female defendant], in a post Miranda statement^] 
admitted that she was aware of the stolen property that was in her car 
9. Additionally, there was a wooden box filled with various items 
commonly used for ingesting drugs. 
(R. 4-5) (copy of Information attached as Addendum B). 
On December 13, 2004, Stephen W. Howard, an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, filed an appearance of appointed counsel (R. 11-12). On the same 
day, Mr. Howard filed a formal discovery request, which included a request for "[a]ny 
evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the defendant, or . . . mitigate the degree of 
the offense," any statements made by defendant, and any police reports prepared in 
defendant's case (R. 13-16). 
On February 14, 2005, as part of a plea agreement, defendant entered guilty pleas 
to burglary and aggravated assault, both second degree felonies (R. 18-21). As part of 
that agreement, the State filed an amended information reducing the burglary charge to a 
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second degree felony and adding aggravated assault as the tenth count (R. 23-28; R. 
106:2-4). The State then agreed to dismiss all charges except those to which defendant 
pleaded and to recommend that defendant receive concurrent sentences on the pleas. The 
State reserved the right to request that the sentences be served consecutive to any other 
sentence defendant was serving (R. 20; R. 106:2; copies of both defendant's plea affidavit 
and the plea hearing transcript are attached at Addendum C). 
On March 4, 2005, defendant filed a pro se motion to continue sentencing, 
explaining that he needed additional time to "disqualify his counsel because of a conflict 
of interest," "to obtain private counsel or a conflict attorney," and to "fil[e] a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea" (R. 29-30). 
On March 8, 2005, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
claiming that his plea "was not voluntarily, intelligently or knowingly entered," that he 
"did not understand the elements of the crime he was manipulated into entering the plea 
to, [] did not understand the law in relation to the facts nor was there a factual basis for 
the plea." Defendant claimed that "counsel[']s advice to enter this plea was bad advice 
rendered by counsel who never investigated, prepared a defense or investigated the plea 
bargain." Finally, defendant claimed that he was "not legally, factually guilt as charged, 
he is charged under the wrong criminal provisions . . . and is actually innocent as 
charged" (R. 36-37). 
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On March 9, 2005, defendant filed a pro se motion to disqualify Mr. Howard as his 
counsel, claiming "[counsel] ineffectiveness and conflict of interest because of lack of 
loyalty, failure to investigate or prepare a defense; failure to investigate the plea bargain, 
affirmative defenses and a lack of advers[ar]ial testing" (R. 46-52). 
On March 11, 2005, Mr. Howard moved to withdraw, and the trial court appointed 
Manny Garcia as defendant's substitute counsel (R. 54-56). 
On April 11, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas (R. 106:11) (copy of hearing transcript attached at Addendum D). At that 
hearing, Mr. Garcia moved to withdraw as defendant's counsel (R. 106:12). The trial 
court asked both Mr. Garcia and defendant to explain their differences. Both indicated 
their conflict involved counsel's refusal to assert the claims defendant wanted asserted, 
which counsel believed lacked merit (R. 106:12-17). The court then declined to release 
Mr. Garcia as defendant's counsel and asked that Mr. Garcia and defendant discuss the 
situation again and attempt to resolve their differences (R. 106:18-19). 
On April 18, 2005, Mr. Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as defendant's counsel, 
noting that "[b]ased on counsel's latest conversation with the defendant, it is apparent that 
defendant remains determined to pursue his interpretation of the law as it relates to the 
application of second-degree burglary charges versus vehicle burglary charges to the facts 
in his case, as grounds for withdrawing his plea. Counsel has determined that his 
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argument lacks merit. Therefore, any further representation of this defendant is 
impossible" (R. 64-65). 
On May 2, 2005, defendant filed a pro se supplemental memorandum in support of 
his motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 70-73). 
On May 16, 2005, the trial court held another hearing (R. 106:21) (copy of 
transcript attached at Addendum E). After confirming with defendant that defendant "had 
some differences in how the case should be defended," the trial court told defendant, "I'm 
not going to dismiss [Mr. Garcia] as counsel, but I am willing to hear from you." When 
defendant replied that "I don't want Mr. Garcia to be involved in the case at all," the court 
explained, "I want him to be available to consult if in fact you wish to do so." Defendant 
responded, "Okay, but he won't be making statements in my defense, right?" (R. 106:22). 
The trial court then gave defendant a full opportunity to explain why he believed 
that he had received ineffective assistance from both Mr. Howard and Mr. Garcia and 
why he wanted to withdraw his pleas (R. 106:24). After then hearing from defense 
counsel and the prosecutor, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, finding that "the plea was knowing[ly] and voluntarily entered" and that counsel had 
been effective (R. 106:39-40). Defendant waived any additional time to prepare for 
sentencing, and the court imposed two concurrent prison terms. Because defendant was 
on probation at the time of the offense, the court ordered that his concurrent terms run 
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consecutive to any other sentences he was already serving (R. 160:53, 64-65). The court 
then granted Mr. Garcia's motion to withdraw (R. 106:66). 
On a victim impact statement completed for defendant's sentencing, Terry Ford 
was asked to give a "[b]rief description of crime in which you were involved." Mr. Ford 
wrote: "Defendant broke into motorhome, I caught him. We wrestled to the ground and 
he landed on me, got up, kicked me in the face and ran off. I suffered a torn rotator cuff." 
In the same statement, Mr. Ford indicated that he had been physically injured during the 
incident and that he needed medical treatment for his injuries (R. 96). 
In a separate statement, Mr. Ford provided further information concerning 
defendant's crime and the injuries received as a result of it. Mr. Ford explained that, after 
hearing someone in his motor home, he discovered and confronted defendant. 
During the confrontation that ensued we got into a bit of an altercation in 
which we wrestled to the ground with Mr. Hale falling on top of me. When 
I hit the ground my left shoulder hit full force and immediately pain was 
felt. Mr. Hale got up, kicking me in the face, escaping my grasp and ran off 
into the night. His friend remained behind and was later caught. I suffered 
pain in my shoulder and scrapes on my face. 
I initially thought I had bruised my shoulder and elbow. When the pain did 
not subside, I visited my doctor in mid October. I received an MRI in 
November and was referred to Dr. Holmstrom at Cottonwood Hospital 
where I was informed surgery was required. 
I had surgery to correct the Rotator Cuff Tear late in December. At this 
point I am still recovering and expect to fully recover towards the end of the 
year. This has been a slow and painful process and I still do not have full 
use of my arm and suffer a lot of pain. I am told this is normal for this type 
of injury 
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(R. 99) (copies of the victim's victim impact statement and included letter are attached at 
Addendum F). 
Defendant timely appealed his convictions and sentences (R. 79). After this Court 
denied defendant's motion for a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendant filed his opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault. Defendant claims that his plea 
was taken in violation of both "Rule 11 and the constitutions" because "the legal elements 
and factual basis for the plea [were] inadequate." 
To withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must show that his plea was unknowingly 
or involuntarily entered, i.e., that it was unconstitutional. In consideration a defendant's 
claim, the reviewing court consider the plea affidavit and the plea hearing. However, the 
court may also consider other record evidence indicating that defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered his plea. 
In this case, defendant claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary 
because neither his plea affidavit nor the plea hearing properly set forth either the legal 
elements of the crime to which he pleaded or a factual basis for the plea. However, the 
probable cause statement combined with defendant's plea affidavit and the discussion that 
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occurred at the plea hearing demonstrate that defendant understood both the elements of 
the aggravated assault charge and the factual basis for it. Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to burglary, a second degree felony, because the facts 
of this case only justify conviction for the lesser crime of burglary of a vehicle. However, 
when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives the right to challenge all 
nonjurisdictional defects. Because defendant's challenges to his burglary plea are 
challenges to nonjurisdictional defects, defendant waived them when he entered his plea. 
Thus, defendant's claims fail. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw both of his guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to advise him of a possible intoxication defense. 
Nothing in the record, however, suggests that counsel knew or should have known 
about such a defense. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that such a defense would 
have been successful at trial. Thus, nothing in the record suggests that counsel would 
have changed his advice to defendant even had he known of such a defense. Nor does 
anything in the record support defendant's contention that he would have insisted on 
going to trial on the original nine charges had counsel advised him of the defense. 
Thus, defendant cannot show either that his counsel performed deficiently in 
relation to an intoxication defense or that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. 
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Issue IV. Finally, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to appoint new counsel once defendant voiced dissatisfaction with his post-plea 
counsel. Defendant contends, first, that the trial court committed error per se in not 
adequately inquiring about defendant's dissatisfaction. The record, which reveals two 
hearings at which the trial court discussed the matter extensively with defendant and his 
counsel, defeats this claim. 
Defendant contends, second, that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
appointing new counsel where defendant's counsel refused to make arguments in support 
of defendant's motion to withdraw that defendant wanted raised. However, counsel 
refused to raise defendant's claims because, after reviewing the record and discussing the 
matter with other criminal attorneys, counsel determined that defendant's claims were 
meritless. Because a defendant has no right to demand that his counsel raise meritless 
claims, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing new counsel in this 
case. Moreover, because defendant's claims were in fact meritless, defendant cannot 
show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, even if it were erroneous. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, WHERE THE 
RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD 
BOTH THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AND THE FACTUAL 
BASIS FOR IT. 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea to aggravated assault because the plea court "failed to comply with Rule 11 
and the constitutions in the entry of [his] plea, and because the legal elements and factual 
basis for the plea are inadequate." Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Specifically, defendant claims that 
his guilty plea to aggravated assault was unconstitutional "because neither the plea form 
nor the plea colloquy reflect the legal elements or a factual basis essential to the 
conviction—that [defendant] intended to cause serious bodily injury to [the victim]." 
Aplt. Br. at 12. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. To withdraw a guilty plea, defendant must show that the plea 
was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. 
Under Utah law, a defendant may successfully withdraw a guilty plea only if he 
can show that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. A rule 11 violation, by 
itself, does not make that showing. 
"Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty 
pleas." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 11? 114 P.3d 569. Under the rule, the trial court 
bears the burden "to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing 
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and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights.5" Id (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, Tf 11, 22 P.3d 1242). The 
objective "is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the 
basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^  11. 
To that end, rule 11(e) directs a trial court to make nine findings before accepting a 
guilty plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). Among those findings are (1) that "the plea is 
voluntarily made"; (2) that defendant understands the important constitutional rights he is 
waiving in entering his plea; (3) that defendant "understands the nature and elements of 
the offense" to which he is entering the plea; (4) that "there is a factual basis for the 
plea"; and (5) that defendant understands the possible sentences he faces as a result of his 
plea. Id. 
Once a guilty plea has been accepted by a trial court, however, any attempt by a 
defendant to withdraw it is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, Utah's plea 
withdrawal statute. See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, f 45, 114 P.3d 585 ("The right to 
seek withdrawal of a guilty plea is granted by statute."); State v. Helbach, 2004 UT App 
388, f^ 6 (unpublished memorandum decision) ("Helbach's motion [to withdraw his guilty 
plea] is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6.") (paragraph unnumbered; copy of 
decision attached at Addendum G), cert denied, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005). 
Before 2003, subsection (2)(a) of the plea withdrawal statute provided that "[a] 
plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
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leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999). Utah courts uniformly held 
that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e) constituted "good cause" 
under the plea withdrawal statute. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, Tf 6, 68 
P.3d 1035 (holding that defendant may generally withdraw plea where trial court has not 
strictly complied with rule 11); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991) ("[A] 
trial court errs when it refuses to allow the withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea that 
was not entered in strict compliance with Rule 11."). 
In 2003, however, the Legislature amended subsection (2)(a). Under the new 
provision, a guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing 
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 
2004). This is the same standard necessary to prove that a plea is unconstitutional. See 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) ("[I]f a defendant's guilty plea is 
not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is 
therefore void."). 
Rule 11, discussed above, "is designed to protect [a defendant's constitutional] 
rights by ensuring that the defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements, how 
defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, the consequences of the plea, etc." Salazar v. 
Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993). 
However, neither the United States nor the Utah constitutions requires compliance 
with rule 11. Id. at 992. Thus, "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty 
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plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah 
or the United States Constitution." Id. To warrant withdrawal of his plea, therefore, a 
defendant "must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11; he 
or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Id.; see 
also Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, \ 16, 88 P.3d 353. 
This is the same showing a defendant must make when he challenges the validity 
of guilty pleas in post-conviction proceedings brought under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004) (providing that 
defendant may petition for post-conviction relief if "the conviction was obtained . . . in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution"). 
And, because the statutory standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea has now been 
brought in line with the constitutional standard, a defendant must make this same showing 
on a motion to withdraw. 
To show that a guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary, defendant must show 
either that he "[did] not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he 
[was] waiving" or that "he [had] such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his 
plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 
637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations omitted). Concerning the second possibility, a plea cannot 
"be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation 
to the facts." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (citations and internal 
15 
quotation marks omitted); see also Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 (holding that guilty plea is 
not "voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission . . . unless 
defendant received 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and 
most universally recognized requirement of due process.'") (citation omitted). 
"[A] court considering such a claim is not limited to the record of the plea 
hearing." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992. Rather, a court may properly consider the 
information that was filed against defendant, the factual allegations contained in the 
information, and any other information the court may reasonably assume was known to 
the defendant. See, e.g., Jolivetv. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (reviewing 
entire record, including prior hearings, charging document, etc., to determine whether 
defendant "understood the elements of each crime charged and how those elements 
related to the facts"); cf. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 12 (holding that, even in rule 11 cases, 
courts may consider contents of documents such as the information in determining 
validity of plea); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1998) (same). 
In addition, "the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where 
the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime 
were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 
545 U.S. 175, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 2405 (2005); see also Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. Thus, 
"[w]here a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on 
that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and 
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elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty." Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. at 2406; cf. 
Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647. 
B. Defendant cannot show that his aggravated assault plea was not 
knowing and voluntary. 
Defendant claims that his guilty plea to aggravated assault was unconstitutional 
"because neither the plea form nor the plea colloquy reflect the legal elements or a factual 
basis essential to the conviction—that [defendant] intended to cause serious bodily injury 
to [the victim]." Aplt. Br. at 12. Thus, according to defendant, "the trial court failed to 
comply with Rule 11 and the constitutions in the entry of this plea, and the legal elements 
and factual basis for the plea are inadequate." Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Because the record as a 
whole demonstrates that defendant was aware both of the elements of this crime and the 
factual basis for it, defendant's claim fails. 
A person is guilty of aggravated assault, a second degree felony, "if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he . . . intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a), (2) (West 2004). "Serious bodily 
injury" is "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a 
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (West 2004). 
1. Defendant was aware of the elements of aggravated assault. 
Defendant claims that his guilty plea to aggravated assault must be vacated 
because "neither the plea form nor the plea colloquy reflect the legal elements . . . 
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essential to the conviction—that [defendant] intended to cause serious bodily injury to 
[the victim]." Aplt. Br. at 12. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
As defendant notes, defendant's plea affidavit listed the elements of aggravated 
assault only as '" commit [ting] an assault as defined in 76-5-102 and caus[ing] serious 
bodily injury to another.'" See Aplt. Br. at 11 (quoting R. 18); see also Addendum C. 
Thus, the affidavit did not specify the intent with which defendant had to act in order to 
commit the second degree felony crime of aggravated assault. 
However, in determining whether a defendant knew the elements of the crime to 
which he is pleading, a court's review is not limited solely to the elements set forth in the 
plea affidavit. Rather, the court may also consider any other portions of the record that 
shed light on defendant's knowledge at the time he entered his plea. See Jolivet, 784 P.2d 
at 1150; Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. at 2405; Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647; cf Corwell, 2005 UT 
28, Tf 12; Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160. Here, the record demonstrates that defendant knew 
of the intent element of aggravated assault. 
When defendant was first charged in this case, none of the nine counts against him 
defined aggravated assault as a separate offense (R. 1-5; see Addendum B). Rather, an 
allegation of assault was included in an aggravated burglary charge, count I, which 
alleged that defendant "entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Terry Ford with 
the intent to commit Assault, and caused bodily injury to Terry Ford" (R. 1-5). 
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At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that the 
parties had reached a plea agreement. Counsel then set forth the particulars of the 
agreement: 
Your Honor, we've [reached a] resolution which involves reducing 
count one into a single burglary, a second degree felony. Also the addition 
of a count 10, a second degree felony, aggravated assault with the 
understanding the State would be moving to dismiss the remaining charges 
counts two through nine. 
(R. 106:2; see Addendum C). 
During the discussion that pursued, defense counsel and the prosecutor explained 
that defense counsel had "looked up the statutes," that the parties had agreed to reduce the 
burglary charge to a second degree felony under section 76-6-202, and that the parties 
therefore moved to revise count I to involve an "intent to commit theft as opposed to 
assault, and then striking the caused bodily injury language" (R. 106:2-3). 
The prosecutor then confirmed that he would file an amended information to the 
court after the fact, adding an aggravated assault charge, a second degree felony, as count 
10 (R. 106:2-3). The parties explained: 
Prosecutor: [T]hat language is basically count 10, aggravated assault, a 
second degree felony, at the same address, same date, in 
violation of Title 76 Chapter 5. 
Defense counsel: Section 103. 
Prosecutor: Section 103. And as amended in that the defendant, as a party 
to the offense while committing the assault intended to cause 
serious bodily injury. 
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(R. 106:3-4 (emphasis added); R. 23-28). Defense counsel stated that he had "[n]o 
objection" to the amended information" (R. 106:4). 
Defendant was present during this discussion (R. 106:2). Moreover, immediately 
thereafter, defendant indicated that he understood the rights he was waiving in entering 
his pleas, that he did not need any additional time to speak with counsel, and that he was 
"[definitely" satisfied with his counsel's representation in the matter (R. 106:4-8). 
Defendant also signed a plea affidavit in open court confirming that he and his counsel 
"have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty . . . 
plea(s)," and that he "underst[oo]d the nature and the elements of [the] crime[s] to which 
[he was] pleading guilty" (R. 18:2, 19 (see Addendum C); R. 106:8 (see Addendum C). 
Based on this record, defendant knew the elements of aggravated assault at the 
time he entered his plea. First, at the plea hearing and in defendant's presence, the parties 
identified "inten[t] to cause serious bodily injury" as one of the elements of the 
aggravated assault charge included in the plea bargain (R. 106:4). Second, defendant's 
plea affidavit confirmed that defendant "underst[oo]d the nature and the elements of [the] 
crime[s] to which [he was] pleading guilty" (R. 18:2; R. 19). This record alone 
establishes that defendant knew that intent to cause serious bodily injury was an element 
of the aggravated assault charge. 
In addition, however, the record also "reflects that the nature of the charge and the 
elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel." 
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Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. at 2405. First, it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who initially 
identified section 76-5-103 as the statute under which the new count would be brought 
(R. 106:4). Second, the prosecutor expressly noted on the record that defense counsel had 
"looked up the statutes" relevant to defendant's plea agreement (R. 106:2). Both of these 
facts indicate that defense counsel was aware of the statutory elements of the aggravated 
assault crime to which defendant was pleading. Moreover, defense counsel signed 
defendant's plea affidavit, thereby confirming that he and defendant had "fully discussed" 
the plea affidavit and that defendant "underst[oo]d the nature and the elements of [the] 
crime[s] to which [he was] pleading guilty" (R. 18-20). Finally, when asked by the trial 
court, defense counsel stated that he was not "aware o f any reason why defendant 
"should not enter a plea today" (R. 106:5). All of this conduct supports the conclusion 
"that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the 
defendant by his own, competent counsel." Stumpf, 125 S. Ct. at 2405. 
Because the record as a whole establishes that defendant was aware of the 
elements of aggravated assault when he entered his guilty plea, defendant's claim that his 
plea was unknowing or involuntary because he was not aware of the elements fails. 
2. Defendant was aware of the factual basis for aggravated assault 
Alternatively, defendant claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary 
because the factual basis for aggravated assault established at the plea hearing was 
inadequate. See Aplt. Br. at 12. Specifically, defendant claims that the evidence does not 
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support his plea because "[t]he victim impact statement and letter from the victim . . . 
establishes that [his] injuries . . . were not intentionally inflicted by [defendant], but 
occurred during a scuffle," that the victim's "only diagnosis was a torn rotator cuff (not a 
broken elbow)," and that the victim "expect[ed] a full recovery." Aplt. Br. at 12 (citing 
R. 96-105; R. 106:62). In making his claim, however, defendant focuses solely on the 
factual basis given during the plea colloquy and on the victim's post-plea statements 
made in preparation for defendant's sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13. Because the 
record as a whole establishes a basis for defendant's plea, defendant's claim fails. 
As defendant notes, the only factual basis provided both in the plea affidavit and at 
the plea colloquy was that, after'" entering] a motor home to commit a theft," defendant 
"got into an altercation with an individual, causing a torn rotator cuff and a broken 
elbow.'" Id, at 11 (quoting R. 18); see also id. at 12 (quoting R. 105:5-6); and see also 
Addendum C. Defendant contends that this factual basis is insufficient to establish that 
defendant intentionally harmed the victim, or that he caused the victim serious—as 
opposed to merely substantial—injury. See Aplt. Br. at 10-13.] Defendant's claim, 
however, ignores the remainder of the record. 
^Substantial injury" is defined as "bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily 
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or 
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (11) (West 2004). 
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Most importantly, the plea affidavit signed by defendant confirmed both that 
defendant had "received a copy of the . . . information against [him]" and that he had 
"read it, or had it read to [him]." (R. 18:2). Included in the information was a probable 
cause statement setting forth the factual bases for defendant's charges (R. 1-5; see 
Addendum B). In relevant part, the probable cause statement alleged: 
3. As the male defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE attempted to exit 
the motor home, T. Ford slammed the door shut. The male defendant 
forced his way out of the motor home, slammed T. Ford to the ground, 
punching and kicking victim T. Ford numerous times. 
4. A subsequent medical evaluation has revealed the following injuries 
sustained by the victim at the hands of the defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN 
HALE[:] a torn rotator cuff to the victim[']s left shoulder and a fracture to 
the victim[']s left elbow. 
(R. 4). 
Thus, according to the probable cause statement, when the victim tried to stop 
defendant from escaping, defendant not only drove the victim to the ground, fracturing 
the victim's elbow and tearing his rotator cuff, but defendant then also punched and 
kicked the victim (R. 4, 27; see also R. 19, 99-100; Aplt. Br. at 11). Such conduct 
strongly evinces an intent to seriously injure the victim. See, e.g. State v. Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, Tf 43, 994 P.2d 177 ("[I]ntent to commit a crime may be inferred from the actions of 
the defendant or from surrounding circumstances.") (additional quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Thus, the probable cause statement provided a factual basis for the 
intent element of defendant's aggravated assault plea. 
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Moreover, according to the probable cause statement, the victim suffered both a 
torn rotator cuff and a broken elbow as a result of defendant's conduct. Such allegations 
also provide the factual basis necessary to establish the "serious bodily injury" element of 
defendant's plea. See, e.g., State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,120, 993 P.2d 232 
(holding that broken jaw constituted "serious bodily injury" even though victim fully 
recovered within six months). 
Finally, defendant asserts that the victim's post-plea statements reflect the lack of a 
factual basis for his plea. Defendant contends that the victim's post-plea statements 
establish "that [the victim's] only diagnosis was a torn rotator cuff (not a broken elbow)," 
that the victim's injuries "were not intentionally inflicted by [defendant], but occurred 
during a scuffle, when [defendant] fell on top of [the victim]" and that the victim 
"expect[s] a full recovery." Aplt. Br. at 12 (citing R. 96-105; R. 106:62). Thus, 
according to defendant, the victim's post-plea statements indicate that defendant never 
intended to cause his victim serious bodily injury nor did defendant, in fact, cause such 
serious bodily injury. Id. at 10-13. 
Defendant's reliance on the victim's post-plea statements, however, is misplaced. 
The mere fact that the victim was probably incomplete in his post-plea description of 
defendant's assault and the injuries suffered as a result does nothing to undermine the 
factual allegations in the probable cause statement. 
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Because the record as a whole establishes a factual basis for defendant's 
aggravated assault plea, defendant's claim that his plea was unknowing or involuntary for 
lack of a factual basis fails. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA TO 
BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, WHERE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS 
CLAIMS WHEN HE ENTERED HIS PLEA 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to burglary of a dwelling. Defendant contends, first, that because "the motor 
home at issue here was parked next to a home . . . and was obviously not presumptively 
used for overnight lodging on the facts of this case," the motor home was not a 
"dwelling" for purposes of the burglary statute. Aplt. Br. at 14. Alternatively, defendant 
claims that his plea should be withdrawn because under both State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 
343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412 (Utah 1994), "the facts 
of this case justify [only] a vehicle burglary conviction." Aplt. Br. at 14-15. Defendant's 
claims fail because he waived them when he entered his plea. Alternatively, each claim 
fails on its merits. 
A. This Court should not reach defendant's claims because he waived 
them when he entered his guilty plea. 
Defendant presents three challenges to his burglary guilty plea. First, defendant 
contends that because "the motor home at issue here was parked next to a home . . . and 
was obviously not presumptively used for overnight lodging on the facts of this case," the 
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motor home was not a "dwelling" for purposes of the burglary statute. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that his plea should be withdrawn because under either 
Shondel or Lowder, "the facts of this case justify [only] a vehicle burglary conviction." 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15. Defendant's claims fail because he waived them when he entered his 
guilty plea. 
"'The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that by pleading guilty, 
the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime 
charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects.'" State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 
267, \ 4, 97 P.3d 732 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)). 
"Jurisdictional defects are defects that go to the very power of the State to bring 
the defendant in court to answer the charge against him." Duron v. State, 915 S.W.2d 
920, 921 (Tex. App. 1996); see also Norris, 2004 UT App 267, Tf 7 (holding that, because 
challenge to constitutionality of statute directly addresses power of court to hear matter, 
such a challenge is necessarily jurisdictional matter). 
"Jurisdictional defects include claims of double jeopardy and facial 
unconstitutionality of the statute prescribing the offense alleged." Duron, 915 S.W.2d at 
921; Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f^ 7. However, jurisdictional defects "do not include 
constitutional violations in obtaining evidence, defects in the indictment, or sufficiency of 
the evidence." Duron, 915 S.W.2d at 921. 
26 
Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty "waives [any] right to contest the factual 
merits of the charges." United States v. Gosslin World Wide Moving, N. V., 411 F.3d 502, 
515 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989) (rejecting 
post-conviction challenge to guilty plea even though actual evidence did not support the 
crime; noting that "[a] number of jurisdictions have held that an accused can lawfully 
plead guilty to an offense for which he could not have been convicted"); Norris, 2004 UT 
App 267, f^ 6 ("'[A] guilty plea waives all nonQjurisdictional defects and fact issues'") 
(citation omitted); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 223 n.l (Utah App. 1995) (holding 
that defendant who pleads guilty "[is] procedurally barred from making sufficiency-of-
evidence arguments"); United States v. Maker, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524, 1529 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(holding that "[qjuestions that a defendant might raise as to which of competing 
inferences should or might be drawn [from the State's evidence] do not survive his plea 
of guilty," nor do questions as to whether "the government's evidence at trial [would have 
been] factually insufficient to prove [the defendant] guilty"); People v. Flores, 655 
N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (A.D. 1997) (holding that "defendant's claim that the facts of his plea 
allocution were false does not provide a basis for vacatur of his conviction because 
factual issues are waived by entry of a guilty plea"). 
A defendant who pleads guilty also waives any challenges to the underlying 
charging document. See State v. Laguna, 602 P.2d 847, 848 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) 
(holding that person who pleads guilty waives any "defects in the filing of a complaint"); 
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People v. Purnell, 803 N.Y.2d 175, 175 (A.D. 2005) ("[B]y pleading guilty, the defendant 
waived his claims concerning non-jurisdictional defects in the indictment."). 
In this case, defendant's first claim challenging his burglary plea rests on his 
contention that, because the motor home in this case was parked in a driveway, it was not 
"presumptively used for overnight lodging," and therefore was not a "dwelling" for 
purposes of the burglary statute. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. In other words, defendant's first 
claim rests on a that "the government's evidence . . . [was] factually insufficient to prove" 
that he was guilty of second degree felony burglary. Maker, 108 F.3d at 1524, 1529. 
Such a claim, which "focus[es] on the factual sufficiency or persuasiveness of the 
government's evidence," does not survive a guilty plea. Maker, 108 F.3d at 1524, 1529; 
See also Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1038; Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 6; Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 
223 n.l; Gosslin World Wide Moving, N. V., 411 F.3d at 515; Flores, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 4. 
Defendant's Shondel and Lowder claims suffer the same fate because they also do 
not assert jurisdictional defects. First, because these claims rest on a contention that "the 
facts of this case justify [only] a vehicle burglary conviction," Aplt. Br. at 14-15, they 
raise the same sufficiency of the evidence challenge raised in defendant's first claim. 
Thus, they, like defendant's first claim, were waived when defendant entered his plea. 
See Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1038; Norris, 2004 UT App 267, Tf 6; Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 223 
n.l; Gosslin World Wide Moving N.V., 411 F.3d at 515; Maker, 108 F.3d at 1524, 1529; 
F/or^,655N.Y.S.2dat4. 
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Alternatively, defendant's Shondel and Lowder claims rest on a contention that, 
given the facts of the case, defendant was charged under the wrong statute. Cf State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 47, 52 P.3d 1194 (providing that, under Shondel, if the two 
statutes at issue "do not criminalize identical conduct[?] the State can charge an individual 
with the crime carrying the higher classification"), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003); 
State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994) (holding that, where two statutes 
arguably address the same conduct, "[s]pecific statutes control over more general ones"). 
Because a defendant who pleads guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects—including 
defects in the original charging document—these claims, like defendant's first one, do not 
survive defendant's guilty plea. See Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278; Norris, 2004 UT App 
267, \ 4; Laguna, 602 P.2d at 848; Purnell, 803 N.Y.2d at 175; Duron, 915 S.W.2d at 
921. 
Consequently, all of defendant's challenges to his burglary guilty plea fail. 
B. Even assuming defendant's first claim survives entry of his plea, 
the claim fails on its merits. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his 
burglary guilty plea because "the motor home at issue here was parked next to a home . . . 
and was obviously not presumptively used for overnight lodging on the facts of this case," 
the motor home was not a "dwelling" for purposes of the burglary statute. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Even assuming defendant's claim challenges the factual basis for his plea, and thus 
survives entry of that plea, the claim nonetheless fails, 
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Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). Under that provision, "[a]n actor is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit.. . [a] theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1 )(b). "Burglary is a felony 
of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of 
the second degree." Id. § 76-6-202(2). "'Building,' in addition to its ordinary meaning, 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons . . . . " Id. § 76-6-201(1) (West 2004). 
"'Dwelling' means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at 
night, whether or not a person is actually present." Id. § 76-6-201(2). 
At defendant's plea hearing, defense counsel set forth the factual basis for 
defendant's burglary plea as follows: "Mr. Hale entered a motor home which technically 
under the case law qualifies as a dwelling with intent to commit a theft" (R. 106:5; see 
Addendum C) (emphasis added). 
These facts constitute "an offense under the [burglary statute] under which 
defendant [pleaded] guilty." Maher, 108 F.3d at 1524. Thus, any claim that defendant's 
burglary plea lacked a factual basis fails. 
C. Even assuming defendant's Shondel and Lowder claims survive entry of 
his plea, the claims fail on their merits. 
Defendant contends that his burglary plea must be reversed in light of the vehicle 
burglary statute because "the statute most specific to a given offense governs, see, e.g. 
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State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994)" and because "defendant is entitled to be 
convicted under the rule of lenity, to the lesser offense [of vehicle burglary]" under State 
v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). Aplt. Br. at 14. Even assuming 
these claims raise jurisdictional issues not waived by entry of defendant's plea, see 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, \ 4, the claims fail on their merits. 
1. Because burglary of a dwelling and vehicle burglary are 
not the same crime under Shondel^ Shondel does not 
require withdrawal of defendant's plea. 
Defendant claims that his plea to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, 
was improper because, under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 
1969), he "[w]as entitled to be convicted under the rule of lenity, to the lesser offense" of 
vehicle burglary, a class A misdemeanor. Aplt. Br. at 14. Because the two statutes do not 
define exactly the same offense, however, defendant's claim fails. 
Under State v. Shondel and its progeny, Utah courts "'have held that where two 
statutes define exactly the same penal offense, a defendant can be sentenced only under 
the statute requiring the lesser penalty." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^  33, 52 P.3d 1210 
(citing Shondel 453 P.2d at 147-48), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). However, the 
Shondel doctrine "applies only when the two statutes address 'exactly the same conduct.'" 
Id, 2002 UT 66, \ 33 (quoting State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986)). In other 
words, the doctrine applies only when the two statutes are "wholly duplicative as to the 
elements of the crime." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985). "[I]f one or both 
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of the crimes at issue 'require[] proof of some fact or element not required to establish the 
other,' the statutes do not criminalize identical conduct and the State can charge an 
individual with the crime carrying the higher classification or more severe sentence." 
State v. Federowicz, 2002 UT 67, % 47, 52 P.3d 1194 (citation omitted), cert denied, 537 
U.S. 1123(2003). 
As previously stated, burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, is defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). Under this statute, a person commits burglary 
"if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit.. . [a] theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(l)(b). "Burglary . . . committed in a 
dwelling . . . is a felony of the second degree." Id. § 76-6-202(2). '"Building,' in 
addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons." Id. § 76-6-
201(1). "'Dwelling' means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Id. § 76-6-201(2). 
Thus, where defendant's charge was based on his entry into a motor home, the 
elements of burglary of a dwelling were: 
1. that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in 
2. a vehicle 
3. adapted for overnight accommodations of persons 
4. which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night 
5* with intent to commit a theft. 
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Vehicle burglary, a class A misdemeanor, is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
204(1) (West 2004). Under that statute, a person commits vehicle burglary if he 
"unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a . . . theft." Id. § 76-6-204(2). 
Thus, the elements of vehicle burglary are 
1. that defendant unlawfully entered 
2. a vehicle 
3 with intent to commit a theft. 
A comparison of the elements of these two crimes shows that burglary of a 
dwelling requires proof of two elements not required to establish vehicle burglary. Thus, 
"the statutes do not criminalize identical conduct and the State [could properly] charge 
[defendant under Shondel] with the crime carrying the higher classification." 
Federowicz, 2002 UT 67, If 47 (citation omitted). Consequently, Shondel does not require 
withdrawal of defendant's burglary of a dwelling plea. 
2. Because burglary of a dwelling defines a more specific crime 
than does the general vehicle burglary statute, Lowder also does 
not require withdrawal of defendant's plea. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that his burglary plea must be reversed in light of 
the vehicle burglary statute because "the statute most specific to a given offense governs." 
Aplt. Br. at 14 (citing State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994)). Under the facts 
of this case, however, burglary of a dwelling is the more specific statute. Thus, 
defendant's claim fails. 
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In Lowder, the defendant, after being convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, a first degree felony, challenged the trial court's refusal to enter a conviction for the 
lesser offense of misdemeanor child abuse. In rejecting Lowder's claim, the supreme 
court noted that "Utah's child abuse statute . . . requires only general physical injury to a 
child's body" whereas the aggravated sexual abuse of a child statute "requires touching of 
specific bodily parts." Lowder, 889 P.2d at 414. The court then held that because 
"[s]pecific statutes control over more general ones," Lowder's conviction for the greater, 
more specific crime was proper. Id. "Further, '[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the penalty which is 
imposed with respect to the general category of crimes to which the special crime is 
related or of which it is a subcategory.'" Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 
(Utah 1981) (holding that legislature could properly criminalize theft of livestock more 
severely than general theft)). 
Defendant claims that, under Lowder, his plea to burglary of a dwelling should be 
withdrawn because the misdemeanor crime of vehicle burglary more specifically 
addresses his conduct. A comparison of the elements of the two crimes, however, defeats 
defendant's claim. 
As discussed above, burglary of a dwelling in a case where the dwelling is also a 
vehicle requires proof not only that the defendant burglarized a vehicle—i.e. vehicle 
burglary under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204—but that he burglarized a vehicle "adapted 
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for overnight accommodations of persons" which "is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1), (2), § 76-6-202(1), (2). 
Thus, although vehicle burglary could apply to burglary of any vehicle, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-204, burglary of a dwelling where the dwelling is also a vehicle applies 
only to burglary of a specific subset of vehicles, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1), (2), § 
76-6-202(1), (2). In other words, it is the statute defining burglary of a dwelling, not the 
vehicle burglary statute, that defines the more specific crime where the vehicle is also a 
dwelling. 
The vehicle burglary statute itself confirms that conclusion. The last subsection of 
the vehicle burglary statute provides that "a charge against any person for violation of 
[this statute] shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-204(3). The clear import of this provision is to give prosecutors 
discretion to charge defendants with greater crimes under other statutes where, as here, 
the allegations allow. See Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 
1997) (holding that statutes are interpreted according to their plain meaning and that 
"statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable"); State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that 
"' [unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be interpreted to contradict is plain 
meaning'") (citations omitted). 
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Lowder, therefore, did not preclude the State from charging defendant with 
burglary of a dwelling in this case. Thus, Lowder does not mandate withdrawal of 
defendant's burglary plea. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS BASED ON COUNSEL'S 
FAILURE TO ADVISE HIM OF AN INTOXICATION DEFENSE WHERE 
NOTHING IN THE RECORD INDICATES THAT DEFENDANT 
INFORMED COUNSEL OF HIS ALLEGED INTOXICATION 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his 
guilty pleas because "[t]rial counsel did not inform [him] that his intoxication was a legal 
defense to the charged offenses." Aplt. Br. at 15. Specifically, defendant claims that trial 
counsel "did not inform [him] that his intoxication negated the level of intent necessary to 
establish at least some of the offenses of conviction." Aplt. Br. at 16.2 Because 
defendant cannot establish either that his counsel performed deficiently or that he would 
have insisted on going to trial absent counsel's deficient performance, defendant's claim 
fails. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show both that his 
counsel "'rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment'" and that"'counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
him.'" State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103,If 5, 37 P.3d 1099 (quoting State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 
2Under Utah law, "[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal 
charge unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an 
element of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (West 2004). 
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48, 50 (Utah 1998) (additional citations omitted)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
To establish deficient performance in the context of a guilty plea, defendant must 
"'show[] that the advice he received'" was not "'within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) 
(citations omitted). "The claim may not be speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised 'reasonable professional judgment.'" State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see also 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Finally, "[t]he reasonableness of 
counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own 
statements or actions," since "what investigation decisions are reasonable depends 
critically on such information." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see also State v. Perry, 899 
P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah App. 1995) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on 
counsel's failure to call witnesses where defendant never informed counsel of those 
witnesses). 
To establish prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, "[a] defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, *{ 22, 95 P.3d 276. A defendant's "'mere allegation' that he 
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would have insisted on trial but for counsel's errors, although necessary, is ultimately 
insufficient to entitle him to relief." Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 
2001). Rather, a court should "look to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to 
determine whether the petitioner would have proceeded to trial." Id. In many cases, the 
inquiry will depend on whether the allegedly error "would have led counsel to change his 
recommendation as to the plea." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. "Similarly, where the alleged error 
of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the 
crime charged, the resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the 
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial." Id. 
A. Defendant cannot establish deficient performance where nothing in the 
record indicates that counsel was aware of a possible intoxication 
defense. 
Because nothing in the record indicates that defense counsel was or should have 
been aware of a possible intoxication defense, defendant cannot show that his counsel 
performed deficiently in not advising him of that defense. 
First, nothing in the record indicates that defendant informed his plea counsel that 
he was intoxicated on the night he committed the alleged crimes. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691 (holding that reasonableness of counsel's actions "may be determined . . . by 
defendant's own statements"); Perry, 899 P.2d at 1240 (rejecting ineffectiveness claim 
where defendant never informed counsel of the witnesses defendant claimed should have 
been called). 
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Moreover, nothing in the record independently suggests that defendant had a 
possible intoxication defense. Although defendant now claims that his intoxication 
negated his intent to commit a theft when he entered the motor home, Aplt. Br. at 16, the 
record facts belie this claim. For example, in his statement in support of his guilty plea, 
defendant said that he "entered [the] motor home to commit a theft" (R. 19; see 
Addendum C). That statement, adopted in open court, is a statement of intent (R. 106:8). 
Furthermore, both the probable cause statement and the victim's statement to the 
court indicate that defendant's thievery was intentional. The victim stated that he 
discovered defendant "inside the vehicle gathering property to be removed" (R. 106:61-
62; see Addendum F). And, according to the probable cause statement, defendant had 
"prepared various piles of goods he had gathered from throughout the motor home before 
being interrupted" (R. 4-5; see Addendum B). This evidence reflects an intent on 
defendant's part to remove articles from the victim's motor home. 
In addition, according to the probable cause statement, a female companion was 
apparently waiting for defendant in a "vehicle parked to the [n]orth of [the victim's] 
driveway." That vehicle picked defendant up when he fled on foot. That vehicle also 
contained numerous other items of stolen property (R. 4-5). This evidence further 
suggests that defendant intended to steal articles from the victim's motor home. 
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Based on this information, trial counsel had no reason to believe that defendant 
was intoxicated at the time of the offenses, let alone that he was so intoxicated that he 
could not form the intent to commit a theft. See State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 
Tf 15, 122 P.3d 895 (quoting State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981)) ("'[T]he 
intent to commit theft is a state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of direct proof,... 
can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior 
and experience.'") 
Similarly, although defendant claims that his intoxication negated his intent to 
cause a serious bodily injury to the victim after the burglary, Aplt. Br. at 16, defendant's 
contention is contrary to the intent evidenced by defendant's conduct. According to the 
probable cause statement, when confronted by the victim, defendant not only dropped the 
victim to the ground, tearing his rotator cuff and fracturing his elbow, but then repeatedly 
punched and kicked him (R. 4-5; R. 106:62; see Addenda B). The act of remaining at the 
site to further injure the victim after the victim is already on the ground demonstrates the 
attack was intentional. See Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, \ 15; Brooks, 631 P.2d at 881. 
And, again, given this evidence, trial counsel had no reason to believe that defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the assault, let alone so intoxicated that he could not form the 
intent to commit the crime of aggravated assault. 
Where, as here, nothing in the record suggests that defendant's counsel knew or 
should have known about a possible intoxication defense, counsel's failure to advise 
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defendant of such a defense did not fall outside "the range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases." Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Perry, 899 P.2d at 1240. 
Consequently, defendant cannot establish the first prong of the Strickland ineffective 
assistance test. 
B. Defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
performance where there is little likelihood that defendant would have 
insisted on going to trial even had counsel known of a possible 
intoxication defense. 
Even if defendant could establish that his counsel performed deficiently in not 
advising him of a possible intoxication defense, defendant's ineffective assistance claim 
would nonetheless fail because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
performance. 
First, this is not a case where the defendant claims that he did not commit the 
prohibited acts. Nor, as shown above, is this a case where the defendant had a plausible 
intoxication defense. Nor, finally, is this a case where the State's evidence on any 
element is weak. Thus, this is not a case where "the affirmative defense likely would 
have succeeded at trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (holding that "where the alleged error of 
counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime 
charged, the resolution of the 'prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the 
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial"). 
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Moreover, given the evidence in this case, the strong likelihood is that defendant 
would have been convicted on all charged had he gone to trial. Thus, defendant would 
have faced not only a first degree felony conviction on the burglary charge, but also at 
least seven additional convictions, and the increased penalties associated with those 
convictions. Given this likely outcome, it seems unlikely that defendant's disclosure of 
his alleged intoxication "would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the 
plea." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
Consequently, defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty but rather 
would have insisted on going to trial is supported only by his self-serving assertion. 
Absent anything in the record to support defendant's assertion, that assertion "is 
ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief." Miller, 262 F.3d at 1072; see also United 
States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 2005) (same). 
Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE 
COUNSEL, WHERE DEFENDANT'S DISSATISFACTION WITH 
COUNSEL AROSE SOLELY FROM COUNSEL'S 
UNWILLINGNESS TO RAISE FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel 
for him after he expressed dissatisfaction with his post-plea counsel. Aplt. Br. at 20. 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court's failure to fully investigate and cure the conflict 
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between" defendant and his second counsel "justifies withdrawal of [his guilty] pleas." 
Aplt. Br. at 20 (capitalization omitted). Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
"[W]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court 'must 
make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's 
complaints.'" State v. Pando, 2005 UT App 384, f 24, 122 P.3d 672 (quoting State v. 
Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 27, 984 P.2d 382). The court should use the inquiry to "apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his . . . 
appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution 
or even to such an extent that his . . . right to counsel would be violated but for 
substitution." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1987). 
Still, "'[i]t is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant 
must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in 
communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.'" 
Pando, 2005 UT App 384, % 27 (quoting Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 31). Good cause "'may 
not be based solely on the defendant's illegitimate complaints or subjective perception of 
events.'" Id. at \ 29 (quoting State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah App. 1997)). 
Moreover, in deciding whether new counsel is warranted, a trial court may properly 
consider whether the court "ha[s] [any] reason to believe that the situation would improve 
with the substitution of another attorney." Id. at \ 30 (discussing Scales, 946 P.2d at 381-
82). Thus, "[t]he burden on a defendant to show good cause is a heavy one." Id. at f^ 27. 
43 
A. The record defeats defendant's claim that the trial court failed to 
inquire into the his conflict with counsel. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's first error in not appointing new counsel was 
in "failing to inquire into the conflict between [himself] and [Mr.] Garcia." Aplt. Br. at 
23. Defendant contends that this failure "constitute^] per se error" and "was also 
prejudicial." Id. at 22, 23. Defendant's claim fails, however, because the trial court did 
in fact inquire into the conflict between defendant and Mr. Garcia—not just once, but 
twice. 
The first inquiry took place at a hearing on April 11, 2005. See Addendum D. At 
that hearing, Mr. Garcia, who had been appointed as counsel after defendant's original 
counsel withdrew, explained that he "was given this case for the sentencing and to review 
it and to give [defendant] my opinion of the plea, whether or not it was a proper plea" (R. 
106:11). Mr. Garcia then stated: 
I reviewed the entire thing including the change of plea colloquy. I 
talked to some other lawyers about this because I wanted to be perfectly 
clear. And in my opinion [defendant's] complaints have no merit[.] 
[H]owever, he does not accept that, therefore I cannot help him and so I'm 
moving to withdraw. 
(R. 106:11-12). 
The trial court then asked defendant to explain his situation. Defendant stated that 
he wanted "a non-contract conflict attorney" "[o]n the grounds that he stated we always 
had a conflict" (R. 106:12). When the court asked whether "the disagreement that you 
[have] probably is a disagreement with the conclusions of counsel, not that you're unable 
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to communicate with the counsel or work with him," defendant responded: "A mixture 
actually. There's—we didn't communicate very much just now back there, so I wouldn't 
say—"(EL 106:12-13). 
At that point, Mr. Garcia explained that defendant had "sent me everything he had, 
copies of the motions, a letter that he wrote to the prosecutor, the letter that he wrote to 
John Hill [of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association]." In addition, "I reviewed the 
facts in the case, the police reports, I reviewed again the colloquy at the change of plea, 
and those are my conclusions and again while I certainly want to help [defendant], I 
cannot go against what I found out and represent him diligently. And so I really don't 
know what else to do. He's adamant" (R. 106:13). 
After defendant explained the problem he had with his aggravated assault plea and 
the alleged misrepresentations of his prior counsel, the court asked for the State's 
comments. The State objected to appointment of new counsel (R. 106:14). 
The court then addressed defendant directly, explaining that the court would give 
him "a chance to" retain his own counsel, if he so desired, or that the court would "give 
[him] the opportunities to utilize the services of appointed counsel." "[B]ut I want to give 
you every opportunity to represent your issues to the court.. . . So it's really up to you as 
to what you'd like to do under those circumstances" (R. 106:15). 
When defendant indicated that he could not afford to hire a private attorney, the 
trial court stated: 
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I realize that you have a disagreement with Mr. Garcia currently, but 
I think that it's in your interest to have the assistance of counsel. I would 
like to give you the opportunity to talk to Mr. Garcia and see—discuss 
alternatives. It sounds like you have done so to date, but with the 
understanding that this is your option right here that the court's providing 
you. 
(R. 106:16). Defendant responded, "[t]he bottom line is he has to agree with my cause 
and argue the law in the facts in light of as much as he can [and] that's not happening and 
that's denying me my constitutional right. I deserve a proper defense. This man's not 
going to give me it" (R. 106:16). 
The trial court then explained: 
I think what he's going to be able to do for you is take an 
independent review of that. If he's simply agreeing with you then he's not 
providing some kind of an independent review. . . . It may or may not agree 
with your position that you have proffered.... I don't want you to 
necessarily tell me about issues or problems that you have here, but I'd like 
you to at least sit down with Mr. Garcia, look at that, see if there is some 
way you can utilize his services. 
(R. 106:16-17). 
Mr. Garcia noted that "today isn't the first time we've communicated": 
We've communicated through letters before. But again, I reviewed 
the file, I spoke with colleagues that are well versed in criminal law, and I 
just had more grounds to tell [defendant] tha t . . . he [did not have] a 
meritorious issue. I can argue his position, but I don't think that that is 
what I should do because again I don't think that there is a basis for it. 
(R. 106:17). 
The court asked Mr. Garcia to speak with defendant to "see . . . if there's some 
kind of resolution or position that we can present." The court concluded: "Mr. Hale, I 
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want you to hear Mr. Garcia. I'm not going to release [Mr. Garcia] from this case today, 
but I'd like [Mr. Garcia] to speak once more with Mr. Hale" (R. 106:18). "Explain your 
position on that and then, Mr. Hale, I'd invite you back" to see "if, in fact, you're able to 
resolve those differences" (R. 106:19). 
The next hearing was held on May 16, 2005. See Addendum E. As the hearing 
opened, the trial court noted that defendant and Mr. Garcia "have had some differences in 
how the case should be defended" (R. 106:22). The court then stated, "I'm not going to 
dismiss him as counsel, but I am willing to hear from you, Mr. Hale" (R. 106:22). 
Defendant's initial comments—uninterrupted by counsel or the court—addressed 
the alleged ineffective assistance he received from his prior counsel, Mr. Howard (R. 
106:24-31). When defendant then indicated that he also wanted to address his concerns 
regarding Mr. Garcia's representation, the trial court stated, "Tell me about anything, any 
other concerns that you have" (R. 106:32). Uninterrupted by counsel or the court, 
defendant explained the disagreements he had with Mr. Garcia concerning the legal issues 
defendant wished to pursue (R. 106:32-35). 
After hearing again from Mr. Garcia concerning his review of defendant's case 
and his disagreement with defendant on the merits of the legal issue, the trial court heard 
from the State and defendant again concerning defendant's challenges to his pleas (R. 
106:36-39). The court ruled: 
Good. And I'm aware of your argument, Mr. Hale, and I appreciate 
the effort that you have undertaken to present that and applaud you for your 
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effort in doing so and my problem is is [sic] that as I look through the file, 
Mr. Hale, I find that the plea and the standard and the Rule 11 requirements 
were met and that I find that the plea was knowing and voluntarily entered 
and that based upon that, that's the standard. 
And secondly that the papers that you have filed with the court don't 
indicate that there's a valid basis for withdrawing that plea and I understand 
that you've got disagreements with counsel, but I also find tha t . . . you've 
enjoyed the assistance of counsel in this matter, in fact, two separate 
attorneys, and that I don't find [any] evidence or basis that the counsel has 
been ineffective. 
(R. 106:39-40). 
As this record discloses, the trial court inquired into the conflict between defendant 
and his counsel on two separate occasions and, on each, allowed defendant to fully air any 
complaints he had with Mr. Garcia. Thus, defendant's contention that the trial court 
committed reversible error by failing to inquire into the conflict between defendant and 
Mr. Garcia, see Aplt. Br. at 23, is simply not supported by the record. 
B. The trial court did not err in refusing to appoint new counsel 
where defendant's dissatisfaction was based solely on counsel's 
unwillingness to assert frivolous claims. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for 
substitute counsel because "the record establishes that counsel should have been 
removed." Aplt. Br. at 22. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A criminal defendant has a right to counsel '"who demonstrates a willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the defendant and who will assert such defenses as 
are available to him under the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession.'" State 
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v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 533-34 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Thus, a criminal defendant has a right to counsel who will vigorously pursue his case. 
See id. However, he does not have the right to demand that counsel assert every defense 
identified by defendant regardless of whether that defense is "available under the law or 
consistent with the ethics of the profession. Id.; see also Pando, 2005 UT App 384, *|f 29 
(holding that "defendant's assertion of good cause to substitute counsel... 'may not be 
based solely on the defendant's illegitimate complains or subjective perception of 
events'") (quoting Scales, 946 P.2d at 382). 
In this case, defendant's complaint against his counsel stemmed solely from 
counsel's unwillingness to assert what he believed were valid grounds for withdrawing 
his guilty pleas (R. 106:12-13; see Addenda D, E). However, defendant's counsel, who 
thoroughly reviewed the files and record in defendant's case and who discussed 
defendant's claims with other criminal attorneys, correctly concluded that none of 
defendant's grounds had merit and thus refused to assert them (R. 106:13, 17). 
Because a defendant has no right to insist on counsel who will raise claims that 
counsel, after reasonable investigation, deems frivolous, see Pando, 2005 UT App 384, \ 
29; Scales, 946 P.2d at 382, the trial court did not err in refusing defendant's request for 
new counsel. 
Even if the trial court did err, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the 
court's decision. As demonstrated above, see Points I, II, and III supra, defendant's 
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claims were, as counsel had concluded, meritless. Thus, "there is no indication tha t . . . 
had counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been any better for [defendant]." 
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \ 35, 984 P.2d 382 (rejecting defendant's claim that trial 
court erred in failing to appoint new counsel where "there is no indication tha t . . . had 
counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been any better for [defendant]"). 
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
request for substitute counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Z^ May 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UtafyAttorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIKj 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 . Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a 
criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and 
the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion 
or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to seri-
ous bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary 
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of recording informa-
tion or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved. 
§ 76—5—103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 1 . Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, 
aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; 
and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or 
vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not 
open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to 
enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 . Burglary 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 4 . Burglary of a vehicle—Charge of other offense 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a 
felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not 
preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense. 
§ 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 . Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held 
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified 
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Const. Art I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be- deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
United States Const. Amend. VI 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
United States Const. Amend. XIV 
Amendment XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE 
DOB 04/22/80, 
AKA UNKNOWN 
6880 South 700 East 





MARI DANIELLE LABINE 
DOB 06/07/83 
Co-Defendant(s). 
Screened by: K. Sheffield 





Case No. £ q | q OOSXH 
Co-DefDAO# 04018290 
The undersigned Detective R. Shosted - Sandy City Police Department, Agency Case No. 
04E023050, under oath states on information and belief that the defendants committed the crimes 
of: . 
COUNTI_ ^ % X ^ ^ 
A6^RX*VATED BURGLARY, ajicst Degree Felony, at 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, in Salt 
Lake County, State^f Ujah, on or about September 22, 2004, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Section ^ ^ fu tah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the 
offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Terry Ford with the intent to 





THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Third Degree Felony, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry Ford, knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or 
concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of 
Terry Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $1,000, but is less than $5,000. 
COUNT m 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Terry D Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than 
$1,000. 
COUNT IV 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Terry D Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than 
$1,000. 
COUNTV 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 




owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than 
$1,000. 
COUNT VI 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Terry D Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than 
$1,000. 
COUNT VH 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Terry D Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the 
owner thereof, and that the value of said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than 
$1,000. 
COUNT VIE 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as 
parties to the offense, received, retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, 
and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the 
property of Terry D Ford, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the 






UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor, at 11689 
South Oak Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 
2004, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37a, Section 5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendants, MARI DANIELLE LABINE and JOSHUA 
SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, did use, or possess with the intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, 
inject,ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body. 
WTHIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: ^ ^ ^ - \ h $ 
Officer J. Petty, Officer B. Martin, Officer G. Moffit, T. Ford, J. Ford 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, Detective Ryan Shosted based on information in Sandy City police report 
04E023050 and on witness statements, and other involved police officer supplemental reports 
hereby affirms the following: 
1. On or about September 22, 2004 officers were dispatched to a burglary in progress in the 
neighborhood of 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, Sandy Utah, Sail Lake County. 
2. T. and J. Ford heard noises outside their residence. J. Ford observed and vehicle parked 
just North of their driveway. T. Ford went outside to investigate the disturbance. T. Ford, with 
his opened hand slapped the windshield of his motor home. The male defendant, JOHSUA 
SHUMAN HALE was discovered inside. The male defendant, startled, popped his head up 
looking at the victim. 
3. As the male defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE attempted to exit the motor home, T. 
Ford slammed the door shut. The male defendant forced his way out of the motor home, 
slammed T. Ford to the ground, punching and kicking victim T. Ford numerous times. 
4. A subsequent medical evaluation has revealed the following injuries sustained by the 
victim at the hands of the defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, a torn rotator cuff to the 




5. The defendant fled on foot to the South. The female defendant, MARI D. LABINE, who 
was sitting in the vehicle parked to the North of the driveway, sped away. The female defendant 
stopped to pick up the foot fleeing male defendant. 
6. The victim T. Ford was able to observe the out of state license plate of the get-away car. 
Officers were then able to locate that vehicle in the area. The female defendant MARI D. 
LABINE was immediately apprehended and once again the male defendant, JOSHUA 
SHUMAN HALE was able to flee on foot against officer's verbal commands and elude 
apprehension. 
7. Subsequent investigation revealed that defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE while 
inside the motor home prepared various piles of goods he had gathered from throughout the 
motor home before being interrupted. 
8. Subsequent inventory search of the get-away car revealed several other stolen goods. 
Defendant MARI D.LABINE, in a post Miranda statement admitted that she was aware of the 
stolen property that was in her car, which includes, but is not limited to a set of golf clubs, woods 
and irons in a golf bag, army ammunition box filled with various hand tools, two other tool 
boxes with various hand tools, two Sony stereo units with wires cut, Alpine stereo unit with 
wires cut, backpack with musical cd's and paint cans, Magnavox boom box, various other Allen 
wrench's, screw drivers, wire cutters and flash lights, blankets, food items, sleeping bags, 
pillows, air mattress, tent, another backpack, fishing pole, spotting light, camera, cleaning 
supplies, jumper cables and various other items. 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this, 
day of 54>te^fber, 2004 
Authorized for presentment ^nd filing: 
/ 
OCOM, District Attorney 
/ /I i J 
/ / / 
^l^stficfXttorney / 
September 29, 2004 
\ ^fe **> PIS'* ** *>> 
DAVIDE.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN, 9218 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE 
DOB 04/22/80, 
AKA UNKNOWN 
6880 South 700 East 





MARI DANIELLE LABTNE 
DOB 06/07/83 
Co-Defendant(s). 





I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 041400524 
Co-DefDAO# 04018290 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney, CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN, under oath 
states on information and belief that the defendants committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
BURGLARY, a Second Degree Felony, at 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, 
^V State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 202, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant JOSHUA 
SHUMAN HALE, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling 
of Terry Ford with the intent to commit a theft. 
FILED : 
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THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Third Degree Felony, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry Ford, knowing that the property had been stolen 
or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or aided 
in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry Ford, knowing the property 
had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said 
property is or exceeds $1,000, but is less than $5,000. 
COUNT IH 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 
said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than $1,000. 
COUNT IV 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code .Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 





THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 
said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than $1,000. 
COUNT VI 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 
said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than $1,000. 
COUNT VII 
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 





THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 11689 South Oak 
Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, received, 
retained or disposed of property of Terry D Ford, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, and/or concealed, sold or withheld or 
aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property of Terry D Ford, knowing the 
property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of 
said property is or exceeds $300, but is less than $1,000. 
COUNT IX 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor, at 11689 
South Oak Manor Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 
2004, in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37a, Section 5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendants, JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, as parties to the offense, 
did use, or possess with the intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce 
a controlled substance into the human body. 
COUNT X 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, at 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 2004, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant 
JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, a party to the offense, did assault Terry Ford, as defined in 
Utah Code § 76-5-102 and intentionally caused serious bodily injury to Terry Ford. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 




PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant, Detective Ryan Shosted based on information in Sandy City police report 
04E023050 and on witness statements, and other involved police officer supplemental reports 
hereby affirms the following: 
1. On or about September 22, 2004 officers were dispatched to a burglary in progress in the 
neighborhood of 11689 South Oak Manor Drive, Sandy Utah, Salt Lake County. 
2. T. and J. Ford heard noises outside their residence. J. Ford observed and vehicle parked 
just North of their driveway. T. Ford went outside to investigate the disturbance. T. Ford, with 
his opened hand slapped the windshield of his motor home. The male defendant, JOHSUA 
SHUMAN HALE was discovered inside. The male defendant, startled, popped his head up 
looking at the victim. 
3. As the male defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE attempted to exit the motor home, T. 
Ford slammed the door shut. The male defendant forced his way out of the motor home, 
slammed T. Ford to the ground, punching and kicking victim T. Ford numerous times. 
4. A subsequent medical evaluation has revealed the following injuries sustained by the 
victim at the hands of the defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE, a torn rotator cuff to the 
victims left shoulder and a fracture to the victims left elbow. 
5. The defendant fled on foot to the South. The female defendant, MARI D. LABINE, who 
was sitting in the vehicle parked to the North of the driveway, sped away. The female defendant 
stopped to pick up the foot fleeing male defendant. 
6. The victim T. Ford was able to observe the out of state license plate of the get-away car. 
Officers were then able to locate that vehicle in the area. The female defendant MARI D. 
LABINE was immediately apprehended and once again the male defendant, JOSHUA 
SHUMAN HALE was able to flee on foot against officer's verbal commands and elude 
apprehension. 
7. Subsequent investigation revealed that defendant JOSHUA SHUMAN HALE while 
inside the motor home prepared various piles of goods he had gathered from throughout the 




8. Subsequent inventory search of the get-away car revealed several other stolen goods. 
Defendant MARI D.LABINE, in a post Miranda statement admitted that she was aware of the 
stolen property that was in her car, which includes, but is not limited to a set of golf clubs, woods 
and irons in a golf bag, army ammunition box filled with various hand tools, two other tool 
boxes with various hand tools, two Sony stereo units with wires cut, Alpine stereo unit with 
wires cut, backpack with musical cd's and paint cans, Magnavox boom box, various other Allen 
wrench's, screw drivers, wire cutters and flash lights, blankets, food items, sleeping bags, 
pillows, air mattress, tent, another backpack, fishing pole, spotting light, camera, cleaning 
supplies, jumper cables and various other items. 
9. Additionally, there was a wooden box filled with various items commonly used for 
ingesting drugs. 
QJL 
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this j \ 
day of Sspterrfher, 200/jT 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
Deputy District Attorney 
Amended February 16, 2005 
lo/04018689 
Addendum C 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 




STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No . cukoo^ 
i,JwL^JLL. _, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
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 G Minimum Mandatory 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: , 
V <y*~- G£SALAAX °^ <L*£o~*J~ ?^nL~£~pl- OAA rrJJ*5 TQJC^^S LU1[L. C ^ ^ ^ M A S V . " 1 
\f\'\i\rrf—J2 <Z2££_ J ^ L 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
2 
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (Mvejiot) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ?j^>) 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and jhe consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses* I know that if I were to have a 
jury trial, (a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
3 
me and (b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
4 
crimes, including any restitution that ma> be owed on tli.ii)»(i •> lli.il .tie dismissal as pai I ml 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may ran 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged am additional, fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the com! finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (orno contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of aplea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below
 r , i 
C^JI^T 
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Ti ial judge not bound. 1 1 ai ::JW that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge . I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own. free will a. \u iorce, threats, of unlaw f ill 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest) No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
• .c Txad mis statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
/hamie or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
,,M
 <**f the statements are correct 
5 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am^jL years of age. I have attended school through the _l grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand EngUsh, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drag, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Dated this H day of ^(vW^v>j , 2 &¥ 
D^ENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for ,_PVU>u> £/ , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ^S^l 
6 
c securing J I. ttoi ney 
I certify that I am the att >mey for the State of Utah in the case against., 
, defendant I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are ftilly contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)^ is7 r^e entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest." 
> 
PRl iSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the. Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's euiltv '~r no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowinelv. and voluntarily made, 
. . .S HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated iln> \ ', ,1, (' r J Lfc> > M)> 
7 
FILED 
NOTICE OF FILING COMPLETED TRA^CRSftTmcT COURT 
20B5 JUL 28 PM 12s 3 0 
WEST JORDAN DEPT. 
To: Clerk of the Court of Apr*. •'> s 
Date: July 22,2005 
Re: Appellate Court #_''••"• -.-•.• v A 
Trial Case #04140* -J-; i < 
State v. Joshua Shun^i:- i (ale 
Notice is hereby given that the following transcript will filed 7-25-05 with the Third District 
Court in Salt Lake City, Utah: 
12/02/04 No Record made 
12/13/04 Roll Call 
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V V ' ) r E E D I N G S 
THE COUIsT Tin,. ii.i the matter oi State vs. Joshua 
.1.3. It's an 0 1 case ending in 52 J. The record should 
. . >:: !:  1 1 r I I a 1 e s j: • r e s e n t [ :i i i a u d :i b ] e ] / \p p e a r a i I c e s o f ' • . 
;;ounsel? 
M R. 1 10 W A R D: S t e p i I e i I H < : > w a : • i !: < : > 1 1 I I i ] < : 




 "' ' *• I I :)wa 3 : d? 
K K . HOWARD: Your Honor, we've have a close 
resolution which nvoives redi3C]r'i count one into a single 
burglary, a second .degree felony. Also the addition of a 
rount ] 0, a second degree felony, aggravated assault with the 
:.'ierstanding the State would be moving to dismiss the 
remaining charges counts two through ni ne, 
" - . '' THE COURT T ] ] • rn w l .« I 1 'w ;:r •! propose, 1 1. " 13, • .., 
:
:o amend the information? 
•. . .' ' • . . M R BC)I< JN i Y i)i i r I I ono r, \ ; e "'" r e gc i i l g t : I"' i i: L g o :i i i g 
to give an amended information to tl le court after the fact. 
1 think that's the besL way to handle this. I believe - Mr. 
Howard looked up the statutes, but we'! 1 just keep change on 
count one for purposes of today take off the aggravated 
1 portion basically and the section is actually 76-6-202, and 
2 that makes it a second degree felony. 
3 MR. HOWARD: The other change that would be 
4 involved would be the intent to commit theft as opposed to 
5 assault, and then striking the caused bodily injury language. 
6 THE COURT: For the aggravated burglary? 
7 MR. HOWARD: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Tell me the other change that I need to 
9 make. 
10 MR. HOWARD: The aggravated language is stricken, 
11 burglary a second degree felony, the statute number changes 
12 to 76-6-202. 
13 THE COURT: I have those. 
14 MR. HOWARD: The other changes is on the very last 
15 line, intent to commit theft rather than assault, and then 
16 the remaining language and caused bodily injury is stricken. 
17 THE COURT: And then we're adding an aggravated 
18 assault, a second degree? 
19 MR. BOWN: Yes, that'll be count 10 on the new 
20 information - the amended information. 
21 THE COURT: And I'll expect that from you, but I 
22 will take the plea on this. 
23 MR. BOWN: And I'll be sure to give that to the 
24 court and that language is basically count 10, aggravated 
25 assault, a second degree felony, at the same address, same 
date, in violation of Tille 76 rhapter i>. 
Kt. hUWARD: Section 1 \ 
3 I " MR, BOWN: Section 103. And as amended 'ai the 
4' I def endan I., do a party fo 1 ho otlense while committing the 
assault intended to cause serious bodily injury. • 
THE COUK"! Th, nil , I I1" I I ^ /.pe L Llie amended 
'. nformation on that. -.' 
9 THE COURT: I,* i ' -i iu-t}. , 
10 Mr. Hale, von v ^ ,h;'->r-i , '•'. u-.v- lll ' ) ' 
11 the amended information; is t. lu-ji. correct? 
12 I MR. HOWARD: No objection. 





THE COURT: Not taking any kind of prescription 
_L "'^ di cat. I on,;' ' 
IS MR. HALE: No, sir. 
±3 i ' '' THE cnnp'i1 M, , phv;; i,
 M l , 1 ,| , (Ji, i i { i v • 
2 0 read and understand, the English language? 
21 ' MR. HALE: Yes, I do. : 
_; I THE COURT": Ai id you've reviewed your statement of 
7 3 constitutional rights that you're giviro ~ -*-. . . of 
•jnLering this plea with your attorney? 
25 1 MR. HALE: Yes# I am. 
1 THE COURT: You understand those rights? 
2 MR. HALE: Yes, I do. 
3 THE COURT: Do you need any more time to speak with 
4 Mr. Howard concerning them? 
5 MR. HALE: No, I don't. 
6 THE COURT: You're satisfied with the 
7 representation Mr. Howard in this matter? 
8 MR. HALE: Definitely. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Howard, you've reviewed the 
10 statement of constitutional rights that Mr. Hale's giving up 
11 by way of entering this plea with him? 
12 MR. HOWARD: I have. 
13 THE COURT: And you believe he understands those 
14 rights? 
15 MR. HOWARD: I do. 
16 THE COURT: Any reason that he should not enter a 
17 plea today? 
18 MR. HOWARD: Nothing that I'm aware of. 
19 THE COURT: Would you state the factual basis for 
20 the charges? 
21 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, in this case, Mr. Hale 
22 entered a motor home which technically under the case law 
23 qualifies as a dwelling with intent to commit a theft, and 
24 upon leaving the motor home was confronted by the owner. An 
25 altercation ensued during which the owner suffered a torn 
IA 
rotator cuff and a broken elbow. 
THE'COURT: And is that in fact what happened, Mr. 
Hale? 
MR. HALE: Yes. 
THE COURT: You realize that by entering these 
:ieas you're admitting to that conduct? 
MR. HALE: Yes, si r. 
THE COUP T ! : : 1 L I i iderstand as Mr. Howard has tal ked 
- -, v <b /ou have a right to go to trial, call your own 
= s, c o n f r c i 11: 11 1 • = w :i 11 i esses 11 i a t a r e c a ,1 1 e d a g a i i I s t 
you? 
1
 • THE COURrl L you go to * rial, " "ale, you're 
presumed innocent. i'ua ao not hav~ - - ' -* : rv;t 
yourself to prove your innocence, t^e buiden's .,pon the State 
pro^re these charqes bpyond a reasonable doubt. .You have a 
-> a speedy trial , to an attorney' throughout the 
'3 proceedings, to a jury trial. The jury must be composed of a 
1 I uup.'jM i il |niur.', in urn I lit..; u n a n i m o u s v e r d i c t f o r 
2 0 ycu to oe convicted, Mr. Hale. You have a right to appeal a 
z 1 j c * • i ::»i i w 1 I e r e a s y o i :i r r :i g 1 I t t: : a p p e a J a g i ] i ] I: y p ] e a :i s i i: i u c h 
22 I more limited. Do you' understand those rights?
 : 
/3 MR. HALE:. Yes, sir, I do. . 
THE COURT: Any questions you have? 
25 , MR. HALE: No, not at this time. 
1 THE COURT: These are both second degree felonies. 
2 Second degree felonies carry a commitment of one to 15 years 
3 at the Utah State Prison. Do you understand that? 
4 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: They can run consecutively, meaning one 
6 on top of the other, so it could be up to 30 years at the 
7 state prison. Do you understand that? 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: The fine in each case is up to $18,500, 
10 so the fine could be a total of $37,000 under these 
11 circumstances. Do you understand that as well? 
12 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Any threats, coercion or force used to 
14 have you enter these pleas? 
15 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: Any promises made to you? 
17 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
18 THE COURT: You're doing this as your own free 
19 will? 
20 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: You also understand that the court's 
22 the only one that's going to sentence you in this matter. 
23 You will probably receive a pre-sentence report with 
24 recommendations, but those aren't binding upon the Court. 
25 The Court is the one that's going to make the final 
1 I determination. Do you understand that as well/ Mr. Ha!<j;' 
2 MK. HALE: Yes, sir. 
'. I THE COURT; I, • - - you - 1' d 
ii , JC>U fn .qi . -ie a i n d a v x t . j'he Court's received the 
affidavit signed by Mr, Hale in open court. The court 
incoip- Kit* ,i L record and iciies upon it. 
Mr. Hale, how do you plead to amended count one, 
h . , i K] i *. » ! , ,('C ' id ^ le-jice I t.1 I j \ \ \ ? 
MR. HAIJFI: Guilty. 
10 1 THE COI JR T t ,c: i I ,< : »i; I > i j: ] .• i I; : > amende i ::c: i n t 
1 1 ' 1 n ? which is going to appear on the new information? 
12 MR. HALE: Guilty. 
1 THE COURT: The amended count 10 is aggravated 
* assault, a second degree felony. How do you plead to that? 
1 . MK , ItAl.K: Guilty. ."•'• ' ' • 
6 THE COURT • & r0u^t iccopts those guilty pleas, 
17 I i - , . rxpnt pnr] voluntarily 
~ 3 entered. *ri i n-r • J right ''. file -J mot on to withdraw those 
zu ' <J oe sentenced not JPSS ;han two or m/^ ro than 45 days from 
21 toda t date. The State's motion to ^r,> >' mil - i 
L r u ^ a :^ne; i <* thnt correct? 
2 3 v* R^v7N: it \ *
 f Your H^ r^r, with the 
^naerstunu^ng :;.jt restiiuiaon won. , ,,.J imposed on those, 
25 , although 1 doubt that because all items were recovered. But 
8 
1 that stack caveat. 
2 THE COURT: And Mr. Halek, that State - I'm going 
3 to grant that motion to dismiss those pursuant to the State's 
4 motion and counsel's negotiation with the understanding that 
5 you're still responsible for restitution if in fact there is 
6 restitution. Do you understand that? 
7 MR. HALE: I do, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Now I assume we're looking at a pre-
9 sentence reprot; is that correct? 
10 MR. HOWARD: We are, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You have a hold that's currently 
12 keeping you at the prison; is that correct? 
13 MR. HOWARD: I believe so, yes. 
14 THE COURT: And do you have a date on that, Mr. 
15 Hale? 
16 MR. HALE: I do not. 
17 THE COURT: I'm going to have AP&P see you at the 
18 prison and prepare a pre-sentence report making the 
19 recommendation. You waive the time for sentencing, counsel? 
20 I MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 I THE COURT: And our date for sentencing was when? 
22 COURT CLERK: I don't know how long it's going to 
23 I take AP&P to get out there, so I would formally set it on the 
24 I 28th of March but that's not six weeks [inaudible]. 
25 THE COURT: I think we've got a hold and so I think 
1 we've got time. 
2 MR. BOWN: I should point out, this came up and 
3 they actually have AP&P agents that go out to the prison to 
4 do these things, so we usually set out for the regular 45 
5 days that they usually request. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. BOWN: So I believe that March date would be 
8 appropriate. 
9 COURT CLERK: Okay, we'll set it for March 28th at 
10 8:30, 
11 | THE COURT: We will plan on seeing you at that 
12 I time, Mr. Hale, on the 28th. 
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5 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 THE COURT: This is the matter of State vs. Joshua 
9 Hale, It's an 04 case ending in 524. The record should 
10 reflect Mr. Hale's present with counsel, Mr. Garcia. 
11 Appearing for the State? 
12 MR. BOWN: Chris Bown for the State. 
13 THE COURT: The status of this matter? 
14 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, this matter is set for 
15 sentencing at this point. However, Mr. Hale, pro se, after 
16 relieving his first lawyer of his duties, filed a motion to 
17 withdraw his plea and I believe he's filing bar complaints 
18 and other things. I was given this case for the sentencing 
19 and to review it and to give Mr. Hale my opinion of the plea, 
20 whether or not it was a proper plea, whether or not there's a 
21 factual basis for it and all of that. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. GARCIA: I reviewed the entire thing including 
24 the change of plea colloquy. I talked to some other lawyers 
25 I about this because I wanted to be perfectly clear. And in my 
11 
1 opinion Joshua's complaints have no merit, however, he does 
2 not accept that, therefore I cannot help him and so I'm 
3 moving to withdraw. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, Mr. Hale. 
5 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
6 THE COURT: I notice that you have filed a motion 
7 to withdraw your plea here. 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: And I think that it's helpful to have 
10 counsel in doing so, and you're certainly entitled to raise 
11 those issues and bring those before the Court. Mr. Garcia's 
12 here and been appointed to assist you to do so. What's your 
13 situation currently? Do you seek the assistance of counsel 
14 in proceeding with this? 
15 MR. HALE: I do. Under State vs. Hawk I'd like to 
16 move to get a non-contract conflict attorney. On the grounds 
17 that he stated we always had a conflict. 
18 MR. GARCIA: Judge, I don't know how that's going 
19 to happen. 
20 THE COURT: I'm concerned that you're down - Mr. 
21 Garcia's stepped in and I don't know that we're going to have 
22 additional counsel, Mr. Hale, that's going to be available 
23 under those circumstances. I don't know that the counsel-I 
24 think the disagreement that you had probably is a 
25 I disagreement with the conclusions of counsel, not that you're 
12 
1 unable to communicate with the counsel or work with him. Is 
2 that correct? 
3 MR. HALE: A mixture actually. There's - we didn't 
4 communicate very much just now back there, so I wouldn't say-
5 MR. GARCIA: Judge, he sent me everything. He sent 
6 me everything he had, copies of the motions, a letter that he 
7 wrote to the prosecutor, the letter that he wrote to John 
8 Hill. "I reviewed the facts in the case, the police reports, 
9 I reviewed again the colloquy at the change of plea, and 
10 those are my conclusions and again while I certainly want to 
11 help Joshua, I cannot go against what I found out and 
12 represent him diligently. And so I really don't know what 
13 else do to. He's adamant. 
14 MR. HALE: I wouldn't say that. I have a basis for 
15 this. The plea was not factually based. An aggravated 
16 assault -
17 MR. GARCIA: That's not what you plead to, Josh. 
18 MR. HALE: My plea does have a first - a second 
19 degree 1-5 aggravated assault. Upon asking Stephen Howard if 
20 there's a third degree, he denied that. He said there's no 
21 such thing as a third degree felony aggravated assault. Now 
22 as soon as I saw the - that's why - that's why I immediately 
23 wanted to [inaudible] out my plea. As soon as I saw that I 
24 went wow. I even asked him - the plea bargain's supposed to 
25 be in my favor. That's why it's called a plea bargain. It's 
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1 supposed to go towards the defendant not the State. It's 
2 supposed to lean towards me. In no way shape or form did it 
3 do that. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, any input from the 
5 State? 
6 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, Mr. Hale's not entitled to 
7 chose his counsel and ask for outside, for the state to pay 
8 for him to get another attorney. We have that set up through 
9 the LDA and they're conflict attorneys. If he's unsatisfied 
10 with their representation, he has to go out and hire himself 
11 - hire an attorney himself and I think the law's pretty clear 
12 that the State does have to provide an attorney to Mr. Hale, 
13 he's indigent, but we don't have to abide by his wishes. So 
14 in that regard, he should be aware that he either has to 
15 accept what the Court appoints or he needs to go hire an 
16 attorney on his own. 
17 The other aspect the factual basis, you know, I can 
18 tell him that the law's pretty clear that a motor home counts 
19 as a dwelling under the law. We've researched that. That's 
20 in his letters to us, you know, that's the problem that the 
21 law's pretty clear that a motor home counts as a dwelling. 
22 Also in trying to get a third degree felony aggravated 
23 assault, I mean, the factual basis isn't there because you 
24 need a charge and there's no factual basis for him getting a 
25 weapon charge. He did get a fairly substantial good plea 
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1 agreement. It's two second degree felonies out of one first 
2 and about eight or nine other charges of varying degrees of 
3 felonies. I understand his position, but it's just there's 
4 no basis in the law and we'll just wait for him to either 
5 represent himself, hire another attorney or accept the advice 
6 of counsel that Your Honor assigns him. 
7 THE COURT: Let's see. Mr. Hale, I think that's an 
8 accurate statement of the law, but that doesn't necessarily 
9 mean the results are binding on you just as far as counsel 
10 goes. You - if you wish to retain your own counsel, I'm 
11 going to give you a chance to do that. Otherwise, I'm going 
12 to give you the opportunity to utilize the services of 
13 appointed counsel. That's really up to you, Mr. Hale, as to 
14 what you'd like to do, but I want to give you every 
15 opportunity to represent your issues to the court. The 
16 court's going to look at those, hear both sides of the matter 
17 and make a decision based on it. So it's really up to you as 
18 to what you'd like to do under those circumstances. 
19 MR. HALE: Well, I'm [inaudible] I don't have funds 
20 to get an attorney, so that's -
21 THE COURT: You don't have assets - do you have 
22 family or anybody else that could assist you? 
23 MR. HALE: No. Not that can afford to do something 
24 like that, so it's out of the question. I don't know how I 
25 J can make that happen. 
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1 THE COURT: I would - I realize that you have a 
2 disagreement with Mr. Garcia currently, but I think that it's 
3 certainly in your interest to have the assistance of counsel. 
4 I would like to give you the opportunity to talk to Mr. 
5 Garcia and see - discuss alternatives. It sounds like you 
6 have done so to date, but with the understanding that this is 
7 your option right here that the court's providing you. I 
8 think it's to your benefit to have counsel one way or 
9 another. 
10 MR. HALE: I definitely want counsel, but Mr. 
11 Garcia's - he'd state he doesn't want to represent me. 
12 MR. GARCIA: I didn't say that, Your Honor. 
13 MR. HALE: The bottom line is he has to agree with 
14 my cause and argue the law in the facts in light of as much 
15 as he can. And that's not happening and that's denying me my 
16 constitutional right. I deserve a proper defense. This 
17 man's not going to give me it. 
18 THE COURT: I think what he's going to be able to 
19 do for you is take an independent review of that. If he's 
20 simply agreeing with you then he's not providing you some 
21 kind of an independent review. What he needs to do is simply 
22 look at the pleadings, the facts, review the file in the 
23 matter and then give you his independent analysis of it. It 
24 may or may not agree with your position that you have 
25 proffered. That's why you have an attorney, and he's going 
16 
1 to be familiar with those that the law and the issues in this 
2 area, and so I want you to take advantage of that, and I 
3 don't want you to necessarily tell me about issues or 
4 problems that you have here, but I'd like you to at least sit 
5 down with Mr. Garcia, look at that, see if there is some way 
6 you can utilize his services, and if in fact that that's the 
7 appointment of counsel and that's really what you're entitled 
8 to under the circumstances. 
9 MR. GARCIA: Judge, I believe we've done that. 
10 Again, today isn't the first time we've communicated. We've 
11 communicated through letters before. But again, I reviewed 
12 the file, I spoke with colleagues that are well versed in 
13 criminal law, and I just had more grounds to tell Jason that 
14 - or Joshua that he had, excuse me, Josh that he had a 
15 meritorious issue. I can argue his position, but I don't 
16 think that that is what I should do because again I don't 
17 think that there is a basis for it. But that's just my 
18 analysis of it. 
19 MR. HALE: The bottom line is the prosecutor has -
20 he has to prove every element that's stated in the book or 
21 code. 
22 THE COURT: And Mr. Garcia is certainly aware of 
23 those and he's the one that can give you some help with 
24 regard to elements. I think, Mr. Hale, that if in fact 
25 I you're concerned about the elements issue. 
17 
1 Mr. Garcia, I'm going to ask that you speak with 
2 him on those specific issues. I'm going to set this up for 
3 another hearing after you've had a chance to talk about those 
4 specific concerns that you had, Mr. Hale, and then let's see 
5 if we can - if there's some kind of resolution or position 
6 that we can 
7 present. Any other options you're aware of? 
8 MR. GARCIA: Judge, again without going into 
9 attorney/client because it really -
10 THE COURT: I don't want you to do that. 
11 MR. GARCIA: And I'm not going to do that. But 
12 basically, Mr. Hale is - has his own interpretation of the 
13 burglary statute, and some language in there about a place 
14 that is usually used as a dwelling. In other words, his 
15 position is that this motor home is a vehicle burglary not a 
16 dwelling - not a burglary of a dwelling. And he also says 
17 that a broken elbow and a torn rotator cuff is not serious 
18 bodily injury, that it's substantial injury but it is just 
19 tantamount to a simple assault. Those are his positions. I 
20 just don't agree with him. 
21 THE COURT: I understand. 
22 Mr. Hale, I want you to hear Mr. Garcia. 
23 I'm not going to release you from this case today, 
24 but I'd like you to speak once more with Mr. Hale. 
25 MR. GARCIA: I'd be happy to, judge. 
18 
1 THE COURT: Explain your position on that and then, 
2 Mr. Hale, I'd invite you back, if in fact your wish is to 
3 retain your own counsel and I'm going to give you every 
4 opportunity to do that. If not, I want you to utilize fully 
5 the resources that have been provided to you with regard to 
6 the court-appointed counsel, and I'm going to give you one 
7 more chance to do that. I'm going to set this back up for a 
8 hearing and if, in fact, you're able to resolve those 
9 differences, let's see what we can do to go forward at that 
10 time. 
11 What kind of date do you have? 
12 COURT CLERK: We have May 2nd and the 9th. 
13 MR. GARCIA: What days are those? 
14 COURT CLERK: Mondays, both of them. 
15 THE COURT: How do they work for you, Mr. Garcia? 
16 MR. GARCIA: Well, on Mondays is when I go to the 
17 prison and do my board of pardon stuff, Mondays and 
18 Wednesdays, and I'm trying to remember - which -
19 THE COURT: We have a morning or an afternoon we 
20 could get you. 
21 MR. GARCIA: How many Mondays - what Monday is that 
22 in the month, the second one? 
23 COURT CLERK: Yes, the 9th is the second Monday. 
24 MR. GARCIA: I think I'm okay on that one. 
25 THE COURT: Let's do May 9th and what time? 
19 
1 COURT CLERK: 8:30. Does 8:30 work? 
2 MR. GARCIA: That's fine. 
3 THE COURT: And, Mr. Hale, you need to understand 
4 that that's the opportunity you have. Utilize these 
5 resources, see what you can do and if you can articulate that 
6 issue and Mr. Garcia's going to listen to that openly and 
7 I fully and see what we can do to resolve the matter. Okay? 
8 | Good luck to you. We'll see you on the 9th 
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7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, Mr. Hale is present. I've 
9 made two motions to withdraw in this case. 
10 THE COURT: I've seen those so let me take those up 
11 too and we'll talk about this. This is the matter of State 
12 vs. Joshua Hale. It's an 04 case ending 524. The record 
13 should reflect Mr. Hale is present. 
14 Welcome, Mr. Hale. 
15 And appearing as counsel, Mr. Garcia; is that 
16 correct? 
17 MR. GARCIA: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: And for the state? 
19 MR. BOWN: Chris Bown for the State. 
20 THE COURT: Let's see. I have - I'm showing that 
21 we're here for a sentencing. I don't have a pre-sentence 
22 report. I have motions to withdraw as counsel by Mr. Garcia. 
23 I have a motion that is prepared by Mr. Hale and submitted to 
24 the Court. 
25 I Mr. Hale, I'm prepared to hear that motion and it's 
21 
1 my understanding that you and Mr. Garcia have had some 
2 differences in how the case should be defended under these 
3 circumstances. Would that be accurate? 
4 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: Is that accurate as well, Mr. Garcia? 
6 MR. GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I'm not going to dismiss him as 
8 counsel, but I am willing to hear from you, Mr. Hale, with 
9 regard to your motion and -
10 MR. HALE: Yeah, I don't want Mr. Garcia to be 
11 involved in the case at all. That's one thing I won't have. 
12 THE COURT: And I want him to be available to 
13 consult if in fact you wish to do so. 
14 MR. HALE: Okay, but he won't be making statements 
15 in my defense, right? 
16 MR. GARCIA: Correct. 
17 THE COURT: And however you would like to 
18 coordinate with him, I'm prepared to do so and he's available 
19 to assist and help in any way you deem appropriate. But I'm 
20 prepared to hear you, Mr. Hale, with regard to this issue. 
21 Let's see if we can't get it resolved. 
22 MR. GARCIA: May I have a seat? 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 MR. HALE: Could I get a free hand to be able to 
25 look at my notes and things like that? 
22 
1 THE COURT: You may. 
2 MR. HALE: First of all, sir, I'd like to just let 
3 the Court know that AP&P did, [inaudible] did try and contact 
4 me and finish the pre-sentence report. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. HALE: So they aren't in any fault. I just let 
7 them know that I wasn't willing to make a statement at this 
8 time in the case so -
9 THE COURT: And I think I saw a note to that effect 
10 and I think the note indicated that you were interested in 
11 withdrawing your pleas that you had entered; is that 
12 accurate? 
13 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
14 MR. BOWN: And, Your Honor, there was a pre-
15 sentence report prepared. I don't know if you received it but 
16 I have. 
17 THE COURT: I do not have that. I just got the 
18 statement that indicates that we're waiting for a statement 
19 from counsel. And AP&P has a copy of that? 
20 You've seen this report, Mr. Hale? 
21 MR. HALE: Yes, I just actually - I didn't read the 
22 whole thing, but I had a chance to glance through it. There 
23 is some inconsistencies that I want to address when that time 
24 comes. 
25 I THE COURT: And Mr. Garcia, you've seen a copy of 
23 
1 the pre-sentence report? 
2 MR. GARCIA: I did. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay, let me hear from you, 
4 Mr. Hale, with regard to your motion. 
5 MR. HALE: Well, I'm addressing ineffective 
6 assistance of counsel, and I believe I've had ineffective 
7 assistance on both matters of counsel from Mr. Howard and Mr. 
8 Garcia. 
9 To start with Mr. Howard, in our initial interview 
10 on January 4th at the prison, I laid out all of the facts of 
11 my side of the story to him. We talked and he seemed to have 
12 an understanding of what happened and he was willing to 
13 approach avenues of defense for me. I raised questions about 
14 the information, about what's wrong, the inconsistencies in 
15 it as far as the theft being charge that I took the 
16 [inaudible] from the defendant - or firom the victim. Nothing 
17 was ever taken from Mr. Ford. That's an issue and I raised 
18 that with him and I also raised the degrees of the thefts 
19 being six class A's and a third degree felony. The property 
20 that they have in their custody wouldn't represent those, for 
21 one the amounts $300 to $1,000 at six items worth that much. 
22 There's nothing in their custody that even warrants that let 
23 alone the third which was a $1,000 to $5,000. I mean, that's 
24 a huge amount of money. There's no item worth that but yet 
25 J they're coming at me with a third degree felony. Very 
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1 questionable. I brought that up and he said he would address 
2 it. 
3 I also brought up information, the language that I 
4 forced Mr. Ford to the ground and repeatedly punched and 
5 kicked him. Now at the time, you know, I knew I had done 
6 something wrong and I am a person who will take 
7 responsibility for what I've done. I felt that that isn't 
8 right, I need to get that information corrected. I let Mr. 
9 Howard know and he said, yeah, and he'll look into that. Now 
10 on the January 10th hearing he let me know that, well, I 
11 looked into those and those inconsistences, don't worry, 
12 they're not a big deal, they aren't going to effect the case. 
13 I talked to the prosecutor and he said he's willing to amend 
14 those, but it would take time and really they're not an 
15 issue, Mr. Hale, don't worry about it. So I took his advice 
16 as gold. Yet that allowed the State to build - to paint a 
17 picture, an evidentiary picture that is incorrect that is 
18 tainted and further allowed them to make me look so guilty 
19 it's unbelievable. 
20 Now at the time I didn't know. I don't have an 
21 actual knowledge of the law at that time. I've investigated 
22 things and I've learned a lot. But at the time, you know, 
23 all I've ever done is go to court, accept the plea and do my 
24 time. So I don't really have a knowledge of how the process 
25 goes of a defense and what you're supposed to do as far 
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1 quashing the information. I mean, he never - he never took 
2 an defensive stance on it. After the first - at the first 
3 interview, he took an offensive stance. He was willing to 
4 address avenues of defense for me. He believed that this RV 
5 couldn't constitute a burglary, that he didn't think that it 
6 was a dwelling, but yet at the January 10th hearing all the 
7 talk was about was a plea bargain. I don't understand what 
8 changed, you know. 
9 Like I said, I express my opinions I've done 
10 something wrong, I know I need to be punished for it. 
11 Mr. Howard had my side of the story. He knew my 
12 intent. He knew what I was up to that night the crime 
13 occurred. He knew and he should have addressed the defense 
14 options available giving my testimony because it is the other 
15 side of the story and it changes the picture completely. It 
16 changes the State's case completely. It changes the way the 
17 injuries occurred. There's definite questions of law there. 
18 He never addressed the fact that I was extremely 
19 intoxicated which I was and that's under 76-2-306 voluntary 
20 intoxication, that should have been an avenue for defense 
21 alone right there, but that was never even presented or even 
22 thought about or even let me know that that exists. It took 
23 me going to prison and being in the population and going to 
24 the library and finding the book and being able to look 
25 through the statutes and that's why I found that and that 
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1 applies to me. Again it was never even mentioned to me. 
2 It's unbelievable. 
3 I'd like to quote out of State vs. Hollands. As 
4 far as making - admitting your guilt, "We cast no aspirations 
5 on the proposition that confession is good for the soul from 
6 a religious standpoint. However, while defense counsel be 
7 not discouraged, a guilty plea in appropriate cases, defense 
8 counsel must be weary less the defendant out of a moral sense 
9 of guilt for having committed a crime, plead guilty to a 
10 degree of crime that is not appropriate with respects to the 
11 acts committed." Being he had my side of the story, it's 
12 amazing that he allowed me to enter these charges and he 
13 knows not only was that not my intent, but it's even 
14 questionable if that's what happened. 
15 Like I said, on the 10th of January we never 
16 discussed anything as far as more avenues for defense. It 
17 went straight from that January 4th interview to, well, I've 
18 talked to the prosecutor, he's willing to make a deal. I 
19 didn't know if I was at the time willing to make a deal, but 
20 he's throwing all these options at me for this. I asked him 
21 immediately at the time I was trying to think of what I'm 
22 going to do and I asked him, well, is there any way you can 
23 form a less intrusive assault charge instead of a second 
24 degree aggravated charge. And he stated, well, I'll try 
25 that. That's a legal impossibility. The court doesn't have 
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1 jurisdiction to construct a statute. There's three statutes 
2 apply that are all assaults and you can't change the language 
3 of them to conform with me. For him to even let me believe 
4 that possibility, he should have never allowed that to 
5 happen. 
6 Furthermore, once he did come back I ask him well, 
7 is there any way you can get me a third degree aggravated 
8 assault. He actually said to me back in the holding cell 
9 that does not exist, Mr. Hale. And I thought about it and 
10 went well, so I had an option [inaudible] . So I thought 
11 about it a little bit more. I decided well, I'm going to ask 
12 him a few more questions here as far as the RV goes and how 
13 it can be a building and in every hearing I wanted to express 
14 that I asked him all these questions as far as well, how does 
15 it fit under a dwelling, how could it be considered a 
16 building, isn't it a vehicle, it has tires. I asked him all 
17 these questions, I mean, I have a 12th grade education, I'm 
18 not an extremely smart person, but I can - it's a vehicle. 
19 There's no doubt about that and the language of the burglary 
20 statute that I had as far as the assault it didn't even 
21 mention - ever mention that a vehicle could be probable. So 
22 I'm using the information I was given in court which was the 
23 aggravated assault [inaudible] and it was very, that's vague 
24 and that's all I had for information at the time. 
25 But me being asking all these questions of Mr. 
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1 Howard should have rendered a reason for him to investigate 
2 and furthermore show me that, yes, Mr. Hale, here's a vehicle 
3 burglary statute that applies to you, here's a third degree 
4 aggravated assault that does apply to you, yes, it drops 
5 intent and it applies to you. He should have addressed these 
6 and showed me all defenses that are provable for me. These 
7 questions rendered that. 
8 Yeah, he's not entitled to do that just out of the 
9 blue, but being that I asked these questions it became a 
10 reason to and he should have addressed it. He didn't. 
11 I'd like to quote another - yet out of State vs. 
12 Hollands. "Defense counsel's obligation is to explain the 
13 evidence against the defendant, the nature of all defenses 
14 that might be provable", hence, the third degree aggravated 
15 assault which is provable, the vehicle burglary which is a 
16 class A which could be provable. It definitely applies, it's 
17 a vehicle. And a misdemeanor assault which also applies. 
18 All the various options the defendant has of pleading guilty 
19 or not guilty and going to trial and possibility or likely 
20 consequences of those options. Should the defendant chose to 
21 contest the charges against him or her, it's defense 
22 counsel's obligation to require the State to prove its case 
23 beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm presenting these questions 
24 that would make it so the State's case isn't quite - it 
25 I doesn't reach that burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm 
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1 sorry, there's just no way. 
2 Furthermore, like I said not only did he fail to 
3 discuss the third degree aggravated assault, he actually said 
4 it did not exist, and that was in the plea negotiations. And 
5 that was like I said that was one of my stipulations to 
6 accepting the plea is well, let me have a third degree 
7 aggravated assault and I'll probably take this and not waste 
8 the court's time. I know I've done something wrong and I 
9 might deserve this degree, yes. I was willing to take the 
10 punishment. I'm not the type of person that sidesteps that. 
11 You've done something wrong, I will take it. That was on the 
12 February 14th. At last on that day I felt there wasn't 
13 something right. I didn't know what it was that was wrong 
14 about the whole situation, but I just knew there wasn't 
15 something right. I felt I should ask one more time in maybe 
16 a more forward way about the aggravated burglary charge and I 
17 addressed - by my interpretation of the aggravated burglary 
18 in the information there's no way I could possibly be found 
19 guilty of that charge with a jury, they wouldn't do it. I'm 
20 not guilty according to that language. Mr. Howard agreed. 
21 He said, yes, I agree. I totally agree with that. But he 
22 sidestepped it by stating this. If we go to a preliminary 
23 hearing the prosecutor isn't going to try to change that. 
24 He'11 actually drop that and come back at you with the two 1 
25 to 15's anyway. But furthermore, he's going to come back at 
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1 you with all those thefts too/ the six class A's and that one 
2 third degree. So it's in your best interest to take these 
3 two 1 to 15Ts. But that right there, that's maybe not be 
4 blackmail, but it's pretty - they're trying to scare me into 
5 taking this, 
6 Immediately I thought more, okay, what am I going 
7 to do. I had no way to investigate these in the court let 
8 alone out in the prison, I was in R&O and had no resources 
9 whatsoever to be able to even investigate what he's telling 
10 me. 
11 I think it's pretty much understood when your 
12 defense counsel tells you something you believe it. I 
13 believed it. I believed every word he told me. I believed 
14 he - I believed the fact he told me there is no third degree. 
15 I took that as fact and decided, well, this is what I deserve 
16 then and I took the plea. 
17 Upon entering Gunnison I was able to get a hold of 
18 Utah State Code and look through it and investigate the 
19 charges I plead to, also the aggravated assault. Also I was 
20 able to investigate a lot of other things and it became 
21 extremely apparent what happened. To me I could believe it. 
22 That's why I immediately withdrew my plea and put in the 
23 motions that I did. 
24 THE COURT: Anything else as far as issues that -
25 I MR. HALE: With Mr. Howard, no, that - Mr. Garcia I 
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1 do have some with him. 
2 THE COURT: Tell me about anything, any other 
3 concerns that you have. 
4 MR. HALE: Well, as far as - as far as when we were 
5 in our last hearing we had - me and Mr. Garcia had our 
6 discussions, and, okay, he has a right to disagree, but to me 
7 I know that this vehicle is a vehicle. It's just simple 
8 matters of law we're dealing with here in statutory 
9 interpretation how the statute's read. And he acted like 
10 because I'm this convicted felon who am I to be able to - who 
11 am I to be able to interpret the statute. Who am I - I mean, 
12 come on. The legislative writes these with the intent that 
13 any person with reasonable knowledge can grab a dictionary, 
14 if needs be, and by the plain language the statute read it 
15 and understand it. But yet I'm an idiot for even trying 
16 this? The man is yelling at me, he's using language in the 
17 back there. I never once used a foul word, but yet my own 
18 lawyer is supposed to be professional, using foul language 
19 and yelling at me. It's ridiculous for him to take the 
20 stance he did towards me was unbelievable. I can't believe 
21 it. 
22 Furthermore, when I stated I was grasping for 
23 straws in the courtroom, I didn't know what to do. I was 
24 looking, okay, they're painting more of a picture. My own 
25 lawyer's painting a picture that I am this arrogant - I know 
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1 nothing, I'm just stating these bold accusations. Well, I 
2 know one fact is for certain, the plea was involuntary or not 
3 intelligently made because of one thing. The one stipulation 
4 I had was a third degree aggravated assault and I was told it 
5 didn't exist. That's not correct. It exists, it's there. I 
6 brought that up in court in front of you. I don't know if 
7 Your Honor remembers that or not, but I said, well, I 
8 wouldn't have plead to this had I known I wanted that 0-5 
9 more than I wanted 15, that was my stipulation. I was 
10 deceived and told that it didn't exist, but yet it does 
11 exist. And I brought it up in court and said, well, Your 
12 Honor, as I remember, there's a third degree that applies and 
13 it drops the intent in that crime and it's a 0-5. And, of 
14 course, the State steps up and happens to say, well, actually 
15 that crime includes a weapon. It doesn't meet what I'm 
16 saying. Well, Mr. Garcia [inaudible] that's not true, that's 
17 a valid - that's a law I'm stating. And for the defense or 
18 the prosecution to state it doesn't exist, or that what I'm 
19 stating it applies to a weapon, it's unbelievable. It may 
20 not be a blatant lie, but it's definitely deception. It's 
21 deceiving the court. It's deceiving you and it's deceiving 
22 me. And by Mr. Garcia allowing that to take place, he tells 
23 me he's a 23 year experienced lawyer but yet he allowed that 
24 to go on the record that his attorney - or his client who is 
25 I an uneducated convicted felon in the Utah State Prison has no 
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1 idea what he's talking about. Yet I stated a very simple 
2 matter of law and I was shut down by the State and then my 
3 supposed lawyer who's supposed to be defending me can't even 
4 argue a simple matter of law with me, can't even - he's so 
5 prejudiced against me that he cannot even argue a simple 
6 matter of law. 
7 When we went back and you asked us to discuss more, 
8 he had the nerve to ask me where are you getting this 
9 substantial bodily injury issue, where do you get this from? 
10 I said it's in the Utah Code. It is in the class A - it is 
11 in the assault statute under 75-102 assault, it's stated 
12 right in there. It's also furthermore - it's further defined 
13 under 76-1-601(10), it's in there, it is in the Code and 
14 he's questioning me if it's in there or not, where did you 
15 get this from? 
16 When I got back to Gunnison I was able to go look. 
17 I found a A94 code book and I looked through it and sure 
18 enough, there was no such thing as substantial bodily injury 
19 in 1994, so it's obvious - completely obvious that Mr. Garcia 
20 is taking his knowledge of the law which should be - for one 
21 thing he's supposed to study up as I read it in the Rules of 
22 Professional Conduct, and keep his competence up and know the 
23 current laws as they read, but yet he's telling me the 
24 substantial bodily injury doesn't exist? It exists, it's 
25 I there. That becomes obvious to me that Mr. Garcia's 
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1 knowledge of the law is outdated. He doesn't know what he's 
2 talking about, but he's telling me I'm an idiot. 
3 THE COURT: And I'm really interested in knowing 
4 why the plea was not knowing and voluntary and if there are 
5 other issues that go to that point let me hear those. I've 
6 looked at your pleadings that you've filed and I have 
7 reviewed those and am aware of those as well. 
8 MR. HALE: Yeah, it comes down to at the time it 
9 could be knowingly and voluntarily, but I didn't have the 
10 information. I asked the correct questions to get that 
11 information, but yet I wasn't given it. Now the second I was 
12 able to get this information, there's no way. I did not have 
13 this knowledge. I did not know that there's a third degree 
14 aggravated assault. I didn't know there's a vehicle burglary 
15 that applies to me. There's so many - I did not know any of 
16 this. It's very -
17 THE COURT: And I have an appreciation of your 
18 argument and have provided you with an opportunity to present 
19 that to the court. 
20 Let's see, Mr. Garcia, anything else that the Court 
21 should know with regard to this issue and I guess I'm 
22 thinking of two issues and one is whether or not the plea is 
23 knowing and voluntary, whether or not there's anything you 
24 need to advise the Court, and secondly with regard to counsel 
25 anything that you think is important for the Court to be 
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1 aware of. 
2 MR. GARCIA: I'm not going to comment other than to 
3 say that if a defendant does not feel comfortable with his 
4 plea for just about any reason, I think the Court ought to 
5 let him withdraw it and let him head to trial. I think 
6 that's always the solution and that's what Mr. Hale's asking 
7 for here. So again whether it was knowing or voluntary, I 
8 listened to the colloquy, the tape of that and I know there 
9 was an affidavit signed, and he says that he received all 
10 this information afterwards, and feels he has a valid point. 
11 Again, any time a defendant does not feel comfortable with 
12 his plea for any reason, I think the Court ought to let him 
13 withdraw and let him to go trial. Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Garcia. 
15 Let's see, Mr. Bown, the State's position. 
16 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I'll say it again. There's 
17 no third aggravated assault in this case because it doesn't 
18 meet the elements. You have to have a weapon to do a third 
19 degree felony. Second of all, that wasn't the offer and it 
20 wouldn't have changed regardless. 
21 The other thing I think Mr. Hale is the mistaken 
22 basis he's operating under is that a motor home is a vehicle. 
23 There's actually case law and I'll give him the correct case 
24 law on the record, it's State vs. Cox, it's 826 P.2d 656 and 
25 I State vs. Cates, that is an uncited or an unpublished 
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1 opinion, but it's under 2000 Utah App. 256. Both of them 
2 address - and the Cates case specifically states that a 
3 camping trailer was a dwelling and it's not based on whether 
4 it's mobile or it's a vehicle. These cases make it clear and 
5 I think that's what Mr. Garcia was saying the day he was here 
6 in court and that's what Mr. Howard was probably trying to 
7 tell Mr. Hale is that under case law that has been 
8 interpreted to be a dwelling and Mr. Hale can't get around 
9 that fact. 
10 The only other issue, Your Honor, is Mr. Garcia's 
11 pointed out that he should just be allowed to withdraw his 
12 guilty plea. I think you have to look at the fact that 
13 there's a victim on the other side who has finally some 
14 closure when he plead guilty. Mr. Hale has failed to raise a 
15 valid concern to have his guilty plea withdrawn. He did sign 
16 the affidavit, he was here in court and plead guilty, and he 
17 has failed to show why it should be withdrawn. I think the 
18 ineffective assistance of counsel is better taken up on 
19 appeal if he wants to do that. But I don't think he's met 
20 the burden. He hasn't shown what he needs to do to show that 
21 his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Everything he's 
22 raised are issues that I think his attorneys dismissed 
23 because they weren't issues. So once again, I think Mr. 
24 Hale's operating on a misunderstanding of the law. He's 
25 I trying to read the statutes and I applaud him for that, but 
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1 he just doesn't read them in the light in which the Utah 
2 Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals has interpreted those 
3 laws to make clear that when he plead to is feasible, he's 
4 met the elements and he admitted to that conduct. So I'll 
5 submit it on that, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 MR. HALE: May I have a word real quick? 
8 THE COURT: You may, Mr. Hale. 
9 MR. HALE: Under 76-5-103 aggravated assault, once 
10 again we're being deceived here. I'm going to read this and 
11 we'll see what you think, Your Honor. A person who commits 
12 aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
13 section 65-102 and he intentionally causes serious bodily 
14 injury to another or under circumstances not to a violation 
15 of 1A uses a dangerous weapon - which is what the 
16 prosecutor's talking about here as defined in 76-1-601 or 
17 other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
18 bodily injury. That is a third degree felony and that does 
19 apply. This is amazing that he even brought it up again. It 
20 is a class B misdemeanor to provide false or misleading 
21 evidence to a court. He is not only an officer of the court, 
22 but he has a duty to uphold as a prosecutor. He cannot do 
23 this. This is against the law is what this man is doing 
24 right now in the courtroom. He cannot deceive the court in 
25 that way. I've read the law. I know it exists. He cannot 
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1 lie and say that this does not apply, or other means or force 
2 likely to produce serious bodily injury. It still 
3 encompasses the bodily injury but yet - and this is my 
4 grounds right there for being mislead by my counsel. That 
5 would prove of ineffective assistance because the fact that 
6 this does exist and I asked for it and it's plea 
7 negotiations. It's not he offers a plea bargain and that's 
8 the end of the story. No, it's negotiations. I'm allowed to 
9 be able to say, well, I want this and if not I take it to 
10 trial. That's what inherent in it. I'm allowed that right, 
11 but yet by being deceived it means, okay, well, I don't have 
12 an avenue here, so I did take the plea. 
13 THE COURT: Good. And I'm aware of your argument, 
14 Mr. Hale, and I appreciate the effort that you have 
15 undertaken to present that and applaud you for your effort in 
16 doing so and my problem is is that as I look through the 
17 file, Mr. Hale, I find that the plea and the standard and the 
18 Rule 11 requirements were met and that I find that the plea 
19 was knowing and voluntarily entered and that based upon that, 
20 that's the standard. 
21 And secondly that the papers that you have filed 
22 with the court don't indicate that there's a valid basis for 
23 withdrawing that plea and I understand that you've got 
24 disagreements with counsel, but I also find that the 
25 I assistance that you've enjoyed the assistance of counsel in 
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1 this matter, in fact, two separate attorneys, and that I 
2 don't find in evidence or basis that the counsel has been 
3 ineffective. 
4 So for that basis, Mr. Hale, I'm prepared to deny 
5 your motions to set aside the pleas that you've entered in 
6 this case. I'm prepared to go forward with sentencing. 
7 You're entitled to review the pre-sentence report. You're 
8 entitled to have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you chose 
9 to do so. You're entitled to raise these issues on appeal 
10 and those are all possibilities for you as well, Mr. Hale. 
11 MR. HALE: The motion for notice of appeal right 
12 now I'd like to submit this into the court right now. 
13 THE COURT: Note - what it is? Notice of appeal? 
14 Okay. And what we need to do to do that we need to take care 
15 of sentencing prior to the time for that. You waive any time 
16 for sentencing; is that correct? 
17 MR. HALE: That is correct. 
18 THE COURT: And you're entitled to review your pre-
19 sentence report prior to the time of sentencing and I'm glad 
20 to have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you wish to have 
21 that as well with regard to sentencing issues. You've seen 
22 the report by AP&P with regard to sentencing? 
23 MR. HALE: Yes, sir, definitely. I'd like to -
24 THE COURT: And you're entitled to speak on your 
25 behalf and I will have Mr. Garcia speak on your behalf if you 
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1 wish to have him speak for you as well. 
2 The recommendation, Mr. Hale, as you probably seen 
3 it's respectfully recommended by AP&P the defendant be 
4 committed to the Utah State Prison for the prescribed - time 
5 prescribed by law and these charges run concurrent rather 
6 than consecutive, but this case run consecutive to each other 
7 - to the other cases the defendant is already serving. So 
8 these two second degrees, the recommendation is that they run 
9 concurrent one on top along side each other, but they run 
10 consecutive to any other commitments that you are presently 
11 serving. Do you understand that? 
12 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: And that it is recommended - also 
14 recommended that he be subject to pay restitution as 
15 determined by the court and there's also recoupment 
16 responsibility under those circumstances. So you have - you 
17 read and understand the English language? 
18 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: And you've reviewed the pre-sentence 
20 report; is that correct? 
21 MR. HALE: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: And you're prepared to go forward on 
23 that report? 
24 MR. HALE: I believe I am. Let me have another 
25 I second here. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. HALE: Most of it's the same in back as my last 
3 so, [inaudible]. 
4 THE COURT: I want to give you more time to review 
5 it if in fact you're entitled to a three-day period to review 
6 the report as is your counsel prior to sentencing, and if you 
7 wish to have that three-day period, I'm prepared to grant 
8 that to you. 
9 MR. HALE: I think I should be okay as long as I 
10 can address some of the inconsistencies and put my side of 
11 the story on the record. 
12 THE COURT: And you don't need to repeat what you 
13 told me here, but with regard to sentencing. 
14 Mr. Bown? 
15 MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I think there's a colloquy 
16 and I don't know what it is exactly that you need to go 
17 through with Mr. Hale. I know Mr. Garcia is standby or just 
18 here to - but given that he's claimed that Mr. Garcia 
19 provided ineffective assistance of counsel, I don't think 
20 that Mr. Garcia actually can be representing him. I think 
21 Mr. Hale's used up every opportunity he has with defense 
22 counsel. I think we need, at this point we need to allow Mr. 
23 Garcia to withdraw because he has raised the ineffective 
24 assistance of counsel on Mr. Garcia, and then we need to go 
25 I through that colloquy where Mr. Hale understands that he is 
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1 going forward without an attorney. I don't know what case it 
2 comes out of or what language it is, but that's something I 
3 think we need to go through at this point because Mr. Hale is 
4 in effect representing himself. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 Let's see, Mr. Garcia, I want to hear from you with 
7 regard to those issues. Anything with regard to waiver of 
8 counsel or that the Court had ought to review or take that -
9 MR. GARCIA: Again, I think we have to respect Mr. 
10 Hale's wishes. He does not want me involved in this case and 
11 so I should not be in any way. I ask to withdraw and be 
12 excused. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to have you here 
14 simply to assist Mr. Hale if in fact he wishes any 
15 assistance. He may not do so. 
16 But let me go through these issues with you, Mr. 
17 Hale. Tell me how old you are? 
18 MR. HALE: Twenty-five. 
19 THE COURT: How many years of formal schooling have 
20 you completed? 
21 MR. HALE: Twelve. 
22 THE COURT: And you read and understand the English 
23 language - have you got a high school diploma? 
24 MR. HALE: I should. I haven't gotten it yet, but 
25 I I've completed all the necessary -
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1 THE COURT: And you don't have a GED as I 
2 understand it? 
3 MR. HALE: No. 
4 THE COURT: And you read and understand and write 
5 the English language; is that correct? 
6 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURT: And you've been informed by the court 
8 as to the crimes you've been charged with. You've reviewed 
9 the information here. You know all of the separate counts 
10 that have been filed against you? 
11 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: And you need any further clarification 
13 with regard to those issues in the amended information? 
14 MR. HALE: No. 
15 THE COURT: You understand all of the counts. I'm 
16 looking here there are 10 counts that were filed in the 
17 amended information? 
18 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: And I've received a guilty plea to two 
20 of those counts, number one and number 10; is that your 
21 understanding as well? 
22 MR. HALE: Yes, it is. 
23 THE COURT: And you understood that it was 
24 explained to you what the consequences are of pleading guilty 
25 I when you entered the plea in this matter, you knew they were 
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1 both second degree felonies that carried the commitment of 1 
2 to 15 years and had a fine of up to $18,500 on each count? 
3 MR, HALE: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURT: And that they could run consecutively, 
5 you understood one on top of the other that you could do up 
6 to 30 years, fines up to $37,000? You understood that as 
7 well? 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: And you understood that the penalties 
10 for crimes may be greater if they're enhanced, if that 
11 applied. You understood that as well? 
12 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: We've already talked about the issue of 
14 running consecutively as opposed to concurrently. You 
15 understand the difference between the two? 
16 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: And you understand that if you, in 
18 essence, represent yourself in this case that the court can't 
19 give you advice about what to do or when to do it? 
20 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: And you have not represented anyone 
22 previously in or yourself in a criminal action, you've always 
23 had counsel; is that correct? 
24 MR. HALE: That is correct, sir. 
25 THE COURT: You haven't represented anybody else; 
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1 is that correct? 
2 MR. HALE: That is correct. 
3 THE COURT: And you have never studied law 
4 previously? 
5 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
6 THE COURT: You're not familiar with the Rules of 
7 Evidence as included in the Code, are you? 
8 MR. HALE: I've read over them a few times. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. HALE: Just recently, but I'm couldn't say I'm 
11 an expert on them, no. 
12 THE COURT: Same thing with the Rules of Criminal 
13 Procedure, you're not familiar with those other than reading 
14 them in recent times; is that correct? 
15 MR. HALE: That is correct. 
16 THE COURT: And you understand that the Court's 
17 going to expect you to conduct your own defense in a manner 
18 consistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules 
19 of Evidence? 
20 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
21 THE COURT: You understand that the Court cannot 
22 give you any special treatment in this matter even if you are 
23 not familiar with the rules that govern the court 
24 proceedings? 
25 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: You're not under the influence of any 
2 drug, medication or intoxicant that has impaired your 
3 judgment at the present time? 
4 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
5 THE COURT: It's true at the time you entered the 
6 plea; is that correct? 
7 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: And at all times that you appeared 
9 before this court you've never been under the influence of 
10 drugs or medication or intoxicant? 
11 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
12 THE COURT: That's correct? 
13 MR. HALE: That is correct. 
14 THE COURT: You're free of any mental disease or 
15 defect or impairment that would prevent you from 
16 understanding what's going on or the consequences of your 
17 actions? 
18 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: You believe yourself to be of sound 
20 mind and mentally capable of understanding these proceedings 
21 and the potential consequences of representing yourself? 
22 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: You're not representing - the decision 
24 to represent yourself in the sentencing phase of this case is 
25 completely your own will and what you wish and desire under 
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1 these circumstances; is that correct? 
2 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: No one's tried to talk you into doing 
4 that? 
5 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
6 THE COURT: And that if in fact you wish to have 
7 the assistance of counsel that Mr. Garcia is here and present 
8 and available to talk to you to discuss these matters, you 
9 understand that as well? 
10 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
11 THE COURT: You're not being rushed into making 
12 this decision with regard to representing yourself or 
13 speaking on your own behalf here today? 
14 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
15 THE COURT: You've had sufficient time to think 
16 about that decision and how you would like to proceed? 
17 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: And you know and understand that the 
19 penalty for these crimes has been explained to you 
20 previously? 
21 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
22 THE COURT: Both are second degree felonies, both 
23 carry a commitment of 1 to 15 years. You understand all the 
24 difficulties involved in sentencing and not having somebody 
25 I speak on your behalf? 
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1 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Good, any other questions that you 
3 have, Mr. Hale, concerning those issues? 
4 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
5 THE COURT: I've got the clerk I'm going to ask to 
6 present you with a copy. Mr. Garcia maybe can review that 
7 and then it simply states the things that we've gone through 
8 and reviewed to allow you to represent yourself in this 
9 matter, and you'll need to fill in there, Mr. Hale, the 
10 blanks indicating your age and the number of years of 
11 schooling. 
12 MR. BOWN: And, Your Honor, just while he's filling 
13 that out if I can make one suggestion. I've seen other 
14 judges do this is where they basically give their own opinion 
15 as to what Mr. Hale is doing today and the likelihood of 
16 success and the problems that are faced by representing 
17 yourself just to make sure that he, I mean, he knows that 
18 this is not a good idea from anybody's point of view who 
19 deals with the law. I think he just needs to understand that 
20 this is not recommended by anybody, not the State, not the 
21 court, not defense counsel because he just - the 
22 understanding of the law is just not there that we as the 
23 people who are trained in the law have that ability and that 
24 knowledge that we can give to him. If Your Honor could just 
25 do that as part of the colloquy. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Let's see, Mr. Garcia, any other 
2 issues that you think are important to address with the 
3 Court? I think what Mr. Bown's raised is simply the 
4 likelihood of success and the perils of proceeding without 
5 the assistance of counsel. 
6 MR. GARCIA: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Let's see, Mr. Hale. 
8 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: And you understand that the likelihood 
10 of success is greatly reduced by not having the assistance of 
11 counsel and that this Court recommends that parties have 
12 counsel and be assisted in all stages of the legal 
13 proceedings, and you realize that proceeding on your own 
14 carries that burden as well. Do you understand that? 
15 MR. HALE: Yeah, I would proceed with counsel, but 
16 as I've stated before by the conduct I can't allow somebody's 
17 who's prejudiced to come up and talk on my behalf and when 
18 they're going to state things that aren't true, for one, and 
19 that are twisted in a way that they benefit the prosecutor 
20 not the defendant. 
21 THE COURT: And I understand you have a 
22 disagreement, but for you to proceed, you need to understand 
23 that in general terms your likelihood of success is reduced? 
24 MR. HALE: Yeah, I agree with that definitely. 
25 J THE COURT: And that you're willing to take that 
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1 responsibility on on your own? 
2 MR. HALE: I don't know about that because I stated 
3 under State vs. Hawk that we can - that you can as an officer 
4 of this court appoint a non-contracting conflict attorney and 
5 that's State vs. Hawk like I said. 
6 THE COURT: What's the position of you, Mr. Garcia, 
7 with regard to the Court's responsibility concerning the 
8 appoint of further counsel in this matter, whether it's 
9 prudent and necessary? 
10 MR. GARCIA: Well, it's certainly possible. There 
11 are other conflict teams that could be assigned to the case. 
12 Again it's such a critical stage that it's always advisable 
13 to have counsel if possible. 
14 MR. BOWN: And, Your Honor, that's my concern is 
15 just the problem is he's burned through two attorneys and 
16 there's got to be a cut-off point. If he - given that the 
17 motion to withdraw the guilty plea has been denied, I think 
18 there might be a possibility that another attorney could work 
19 with him on that issue of sentencing. I mean, that's - but 
20 if that is granted by the court, I mean, he's got to 
21 understand that he just can't - that that will be his last 
22 opportunity to have an attorney appointed. We just don't 
23 want to keep having this issue that keeps coming up because 
24 he's going to keep having problems with his attorneys if he 
25 J continues to argue about this aggravated assault and burglary 
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1 aspect because the law just is not on his side when he argues 
2 that. And so if he is able to get beyond that issue with an 
3 attorney and understand that that attorney's not being 
4 appointed to discuss that issue to argue it but rather to 
5 maybe put into the context of sentencing, I don't know if the 
6 State would be opposed, but that's the problem we run into is 
7 I just don't know of any attorney who's going to be able to 
8 agree with him on the case law. It's pretty clear on that 
9 issue. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Hale, I think the underlying factor 
11 here is that sentencing is a critical stage of the 
12 proceedings here and that we have described and discuss for 
13 quite a while here the perils of proceeding without the 
14 assistance of counsel. I'm concerned that you are in a stage 
15 where you go this alone and based upon everything I've heard, 
16 I'm prepared to allow Mr. Garcia to withdraw at this stage 
17 now that I've denied your motion and appoint counsel for you 
18 for sentencing purposes and so that you can communicate with 
19 counsel and review this issue. Do you understand that this 
20 is really the last opportunity for you to ask for the 
21 assistance of counsel if you wish for the Court do to so. 
22 MR. HALE: I don't need to - we've already 
23 addressed the issues as far as the aggravated assault and all 
24 that. That's been addressed. You turned those down, that's 
25 fine. I don't need an attorney for being sentenced. I can 
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1 definitely -
2 THE COURT: And I'm just telling you that it's a 
3 critical stage in the proceedings and it's important to have 
4 an attorney and that you need to understand that Mr. Garcia's 
5 here and available to consult if you wish to consult with 
6 him, and I will make another attorney available - another 
7 conflict attorney available if in fact you deem that you 
8 would like to have -
9 MR. HALE: I appreciate it, but I should be okay, I 
10 understand it and -
11 THE COURT: Mr. Garcia, anything else that needs to 
12 be addressed that if he wishes to proceed, anything that he 
13 needs to be aware of prior to proceeding on his own? 
14 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, I believe he was informed 
15 in as clear a way as you can. It appears to understand. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. That offer's available to you, 
17 Mr. Hale, so it's your choice. Do you want to think about 
18 it? 
19 MR. HALE: Nay. 
20 THE COURT: Do you want to proceed? 
21 MR. HALE: I've been thinking about it and I want 
22 to proceed. 
23 THE COURT: Based upon that waiver of counsel, are 
24 you prepared that and signed it? 
25 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: Would you review that, Mr. Garcia, as 
2 well? You might note in there, Mr. Garcia, that the as 
3 second degree felonies the offenses that are included there 
4 are infractions up to A misdemeanors. We probably ought to 
5 note that there are two second degree burglary, a second 
6 degree burglary and a aggravated assault second degree, and 
7 we've reviewed the penalties associated with that. They had 
8 ought to be included on there as the offense. 
9 MR. GARCIA: Do you want me to write them in? 
10 THE COURT: I would like you to write those in and 
11 I'd like Mr. Hale to review those and initial those. And 
12 while we're doing that let me - Mr. Hale, Mr. Garcia is 
13 writing in there the offenses, both second degree felonies. 
14 You understand the penalty for a second degree felony? 
15 MR. HALE: Yes, sir, I do. 
16 THE COURT: One to 15 years by way of a commitment 
17 at the Utah State Prison and a fine of up to $18,500. Do you 
18 understand that? 
19 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: And that they can run consecutively, 
21 meaning one on top of the other, it could be up to 30 years 
22 by way of commitment and a fine of up to $37,000? 
23 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
24 THE COURT: Do you understand that? 
25 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
54 
1 THE COURT: Any questions you have on the penalty 
2 phase of things? 
3 MR. HALE: No, I don't believe there is. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Garcia has noted the 
5 penalties there and if you would initial that indicating that 
6 you have done so. You've initialed all of the other 
7 statements up and down? 
8 Do you want to [inaudible] that, counsel? 
9 Okay, let's see, Mr. Hale, with that offer that you 
10 are entitled - that I am prepared to appoint counsel to 
11 assist you, I'm going to ask Mr. Garcia to continue to remain 
12 here and be available to you if, in fact, you wish to utilize 
13 his services, and do not wish to receive the appointment of 
14 counsel. You're entitled to speak on behalf of the report. 
15 The recommendation is that you serve two concurrent 
16 commitments on 1 to 15 years on both of the pleas that you've 
17 entered in this case and that they run consecutive to any 
18 other commitment that you're currently serving. Anything you 
19 wish to address to the court on those issues? 
20 MR. HALE: As far as AP&P's assessment of me, they 
21 have a couple contradictory statements in here where it 
22 states that immediately after I was released from jail on a 
23 probation I immediately violated my probation and was on the 
24 run. But then again in the same paragraph it states that the 
25 J defendant was approximately on supervision for four months. 
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1 They're contradicting themselves there. It also states that 
2 I've had long periods of time of unemployment. I was in jail 
3 for a year a month or so, that was unemployment, but besides 
4 that I've had a job since I got out. I had to support 
5 myself, feed myself, cloth myself. I had to have a job and 
6 I've worked ever since. I don't know where they're getting 
7 that information, and making better use of my time, they 
8 don't even know what my time is used as so how can they make 
9 a statement like that? 
10 Let me read some more here. My reporting agent, I 
11 met him numerous times, I talked to him on the phone numerous 
12 times, he states that he never met me until I appeared in 
13 court for his order to show cause. But I talked to him, I 
14 talked to him about changing addresses on probation, on new 
15 jobs, I let him know I was working for my parents. My dad 
16 has a hardwood floor company, I was working for that. I let 
17 him know that I got a new job and switched. I'd say there's 
18 probably seven or eight different phone conversations at 
19 least and two appearances that I made, one of which he didn't 
20 show up for. So there is definitely - I tried to make my 
21 probation work. 
22 Yeah, the violations started from that - stems from 
23 my - when I came to AP&P and they had me on video coming in, 
24 he wanted me to come in at 5:00 or later. I came in and he 
25 had gone home at 3:00, but yet he told me that it was crucial 
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1 that I come in at 5:00. And that's where the - that's 
2 actually where the violations stem from to begin with. So 
3 it's questionable how AP&P is taking such a - they're rigid 
4 with me for some reason and there's a lot of things that 
5 happened at that office that's not on this record. 
6 THE COURT: Let's see. Mr. Hale - I'm regardless 
7 of what happens here, I'm anxious for you to be successful in 
8 the long run, and whether that includes time in prison and 
9 paying for these crimes or whatever the course is, you've got 
10 to make a decision, a conscious decision to change what's 
11 happened in the past and turn around and make a difference, 
12 and whatever happens here, I'm anxious for you to do that. 
13 You seem talented, you seem capable, you're energetic. I 
14 appreciate what you've done here today to present these 
15 issues to the court. You're to be commended for that and I'm 
16 simply anxious for you to move on, put these things behind 
17 you and use those talents for good purposes. Do you 
18 understand that? 
19 MR. HALE: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Let's see, anything -
21 MR. HALE: Could I address as far as -
22 THE COURT: Anything else you wish to -
23 MR. HALE: Well, I'd like to just give my side of 
24 the story. 
25 I THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. HALE: On I believe it was the 28th of 
2 September, I don't have it right in front of me, but I 
3 believe that's when it occurred. I went on the run about two 
4 months before that and it was just getting unbearable to try 
5 and work and to stay out of being incarcerated. So I did go 
6 and commit a crime. I went out one night like it says in the 
7 report here and started stealing things out of cars. I went 
8 around and stole some things and then I went to Mr. Ford's 
9 house and I attempted to get into his truck and his truck was 
10 locked. I then went over and saw his RV sitting on the side 
11 of the house and I went and opened the door and it was 
12 unlocked. I walked in and I looked around to see what was in 
13 there. And there wasn't much of anything in there. It says 
14 I collected some piles, but I really didn't collect any 
15 piles. There was piles of things all over. It was kind of a 
16 cluttered vehicle anyway, piles of things all over. The only 
17 thing I did get is there was some alcohol, some beer in the 
18 frig that I grabbed out of there and I was going to take 
19 that, but I decided at the last minute I wouldn't. At that 
20 point Mr. Ford hit the windshield and I was on my way out of 
21 the vehicle. I had the door about half way opened and I was 
22 climbing out of the vehicle when he charged the door, I 
23 believe. I couldn't see him so I couldn't tell you, but the 
24 door was slammed shut on me and at that point I got hit in 
25 I the head and I opened the door back up right after it 
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1 happened and he had backed away and allowed me to get out of 
2 the vehicle. I tried, I was going to jump the fence and he 
3 came up and grabbed me by the arms. At that point I sat 
4 there for a period of exactly three seconds and thought about 
5 what I'm going to do. I'm really not a violent person. I 
6 don't like to hurt people. I never had the intention ever to 
7 cause any injury to this man. That's why I wasn't going into 
8 his house. I was out in a vehicle. I didn't want to hurt 
9 that guy and I do feel horrible for the fact the he is 
10 injured, he was injured because of my actions. At that point 
11 he grabbed my arms and I reached up and grabbed his arms just 
12 kind of pulled him off my arms and we both fell backwards. I 
13 got up and ran away. It states that I kicked him and punched 
14 him. I didn't do that. The medical evaluation has fractured 
15 elbow and a torn rotator cuff all in the same line. It 
16 doesn't talk about contusions or anything that would come 
17 with kicking and punching repeatedly. I never did that. 
18 Never, ever, ever. I don't know if Mr. Ford would agree with 
19 that or not, but I didn't do that. That's my version of the 
20 story. I got up and ran off and that was the end of it. 
21 THE COURT: And you've stated as much right here 
22 that this isn't conduct you should have been engaged in 
23 regardless of what -
24 MR. HALE: Regardless. 
25 THE COURT: - what happened and it's not going to 
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1 be tolerated by the Court. There's no reason for the victims 
2 to be put in that kind of situation where they even need to 
3 take any kind of remedial action. And so you understand that 
4 I feel strongly about what took place here, that it doesn't 
5 have any place in our community or society. 
6 MR. HALE: Couldn't agree more. 
7 THE COURT: And that there are prices that need to 
8 be paid by virtue of that. 
9 MR. HALE: Definitely. I'd like to let the court 
10 know that I am sorry to the victim. I am sorry for the pain 
11 I've put him through physically and probably emotionally and 
12 whatever else financial he might have stressed. I'm sorry to 
13 his wife and his family. I'm sure they have fear now when 
14 they hear a noise outside, and I understand that. I put them 
15 in it. 
16 THE COURT: In a way it's a long-term fear that's 
17 hard to quantify. 
18 MR. HALE: It is and I'm - yes. And I'm really 
19 sorry to him. Mr. Ford, if he's here I'd like to apologize 
20 to him and let him know I'm sorry for what I put the man 
21 through. 
22 THE COURT: And I appreciate your statement with 
23 regard to that. 
24 Let's see, Mr. Garcia, anything else I ought to 
25 I know under these circumstances? 
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1 MR. GARCIA: No, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Let's see, the State, any 
3 victims that are present? 
4 MR. BOWN: Do you want to see if Mr. Ford is here? 
5 THE COURT: Yeah, I will do so. Let's see. Is Mr. 
6 Ford present in the audience? I have called that and not 
7 getting any indication. You have communicated with him, Mr. 
8 Bown? 
9 MR. BOWN: I received a letter from him that I'm 
10 just going to read into the -
11 THE COURT: Okay, why don't you make your statement 
12 and then any information from Mr. Ford that you wish to 
13 present let's hear it. 
14 MR. BOWN: Well, as part of the plea agreement, we 
15 agreed that we would recommend that the sentences run 
16 concurrent to each other but that they run consecutive to the 
17 current prison sentence that Mr. Hale is serving. We'd ask 
18 that restitution be held open and I think Mr. Ford's letter 
19 will explain why, and then if I could just read the letter at 
20 this time? 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 MR. BOWN: "On or about September 28, 2005, I was 
23 involved in an incident with Mr. Hale. Late at night I was 
24 wakened by the noise of someone in my motor home. I went 
25 outside to discover Mr. Hale inside the vehicle gathering 
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1 property to be removed. During the confrontation that 
2 ensued, we got into a bit of an altercation which we wrestled 
3 to the ground with Mr. Hale falling on top of me. When I hit 
4 the ground my left shoulder hit full force and immediate pain 
5 was felt. Mr. Hale got up kicking me in the face, escaping 
6 my grasp and ran off into the night. His friend remained 
7 behind and was later caught. I suffered pain in my shoulder 
8 and scrapes on my face. I initially thought I had bruised my 
9 shoulder and elbow. When the pain did not subside, I visited 
10 my doctor in mid-October. I received an MRI in November and 
11 I was referred to Dr. Holstrom at Cottonwood Hospital where I 
12 was informed surgery was required. I had surgery to correct 
13 the rotator cuff tear in late December. 
14 "At this point I am still recovering and expect to 
15 fully recover towards the end of the year. This has been a 
16 slow and painful process and I still do not have full use of 
17 my arm and suffer a lot of pain. I am told this is normal 
18 for this type of injury. 
19 "Unfortunately, my medical bills to date have been 
20 turned into my insurance company and I cannot locate the 
21 copies at this time, so the bills will not be available for a 
22 while. Also treatment is not yet completed. I am still in 
23 physical therapy. 
24 "Later in the evening of the incident I was again 
25 visited by thieves. Someone threw a brick through my truck 
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1 window and stole my laptop out of my truck. I cannot prove 
2 this was the work of Mr. Hale, but had no reason to suspect 
3 otherwise at this point. I originally did not believe 
4 anything was taken from the motor home, but later discovered 
5 that some things were taken and some damage was done. It 
6 appears that Mr. Hale broke some paneling and tore out an 
7 electric box in the vehicle while he was trying to remove a 
8 portable TV. I also noticed that the remote controls were 
9 missing for the TV's. Perhaps he put them in his pocket, I 
10 don't know. Additionally an eye scope vision - a night 
11 vision scope was missing and a pair of binoculars. 
12 "As far as punishment goes, I prefer to leave that 
13 to the judgment of the court. I'm not a vindictive person, 
14 but also not a bleeding heart. I have been hurt and I am 
15 still angry. I do believe in taking responsibility for one's 
16 actions. I guess my feelings would be to help the young man 
17 be productive if the odds were for that working out. But if 
18 he is one of those who has spent these several months doing 
19 nothing and showing no attempt to turn around, well, put him 
20 where he can't keep hurting. I think in that case he has 
21 already made his decision. Thank you for your time in 
22 reading this. Terry Ford." 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else from the 
24 state? 
25 MR. BOWN: No, I think the recommendation is 
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1 appropriate, Your Honor, it takes into account that Mr. Hale 
2 is in custody already and I think the concurrent on the two 
3 seconds for [inaudible] that this is not the same type of 
4 crime that he's in prison for which is the I think it's sex 
5 abuse of a child, but -
6 MR. HALE: That's sex is not right either. You've 
7 got to state facts. 
8 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to let you comment. 
9 Let me hear from Mr. Bown first, okay? 
10 MR. BOWN: For whatever he's in on, it's a sex type 
11 offense and that, you know, it needs to run consecutive 
12 because he was on parole at the time when this occurred. 
13 Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else, 
15 clarification, Mr. Hale? 
16 MR. HALE: No, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Hale, it's the sentence of this 
18 court that pursuant to the pleas that have been entered in 
19 this case, burglary, a second degree felony, that you be 
20 subject - that you are sentenced to a commitment of one to 15 
21 years and a fine of $550. And pursuant to the aggravated 
22 assault, a second degree felony, which a guilty plea was 
23 entered that you are sentenced to a commitment of one to 15 
24 years and a five of $550. I'm going to run those concurrent, 
25 J and the reason I run those concurrent is because I've got 
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some hope and good things that are going to happen to you in 
the future and in light of the fact that you were on 
probation, I think it's appropriate that they run consecutive 
to any other sentences that you're serving. Get in, let's 
get these things over and done and take care of it. As I 
said to you before, you're too talented, capable to not do 
so. 
Recoupment set in the amount of $450, restitution 
is - I'm going to leave open for a period of 60 days. The 
board will take care of those financial matters with you, Mr. 
Hale, and those are the terms and conditions of the sentence. 
I would like you to prepare a letter of apology 
that you send to Mr. Ford. I think that would be good for 
you and I think it would be good for Mr. Ford. He sent a 
letter there, and if you could get that either to Mr. Garcia 
or to the clerk of the court, one of those and we'll make the 
- send that along. But it seems like restitution it may be 
joint and several if in fact there's a co-defendant that's 
also involved in this matter, and otherwise it's your 
responsibility to take care of it. Mr. Hale, thanks. You've 
conducted yourself appropriately and well today. Good luck 
to you. 
MR. HALE: Thank you. Can I file this in 
court? 
THE COURT: You may. And you may speak with Mr. 
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1 Garcia if you have any questions about procedure and 
2 following that, I'm going to allow Mr. Garcia to withdraw 
3 from the case, 
4 Thanks for your services and assistance. 
5 Let me have you review those, show those to Mr. 
6 Garcia first and then review those and then I'm going to 
7 allow Mr. Garcia to withdraw. 
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5. Have you received any counseling or therapy as a result of this crime? 
6. Has this crime affected your ability to earn a living? 
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Anticipated loss of wages: 
Does your employer pay wages when you are in court? 
What are your hourly wages? 
Please enclose a letter from your employer if you have lost wages or benefits. 
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Please mail this form to the office of the District Attorney of Salt Lake County, Witness Assistance 
Unit, 2001 South State S3700, Salt Lake City UT 84190-1210. 
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return this form to the above address. 
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March 17. 2005 DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Dear Mr. Yocum, G C JUSTICE 
Please find enclosed a victim impact statement as requested by your office. 
On or about Sept 28, 2005,1 was involved in an incident with Mr. Hale. 
Late at night I was awakened by the noise of someone in my motor home. I 
went outside and discovered Mr. Hale inside the vehicle and gathering 
property to be removed. 
During the confrontation that ensued we got into a bit of an altercation in 
which we wrestled to the ground with Mr. Hale falling on top of me. When 
I hit the ground my left shoulder hit full force and immediate pain was felt. 
Mr. Hale got up, kicking me in the face, escaping my grasp and ran off into 
the night. His friend remained behind and was later caught. I suffered pain 
in my shoulder and scrapes on my face. 
I initially thought I had bruised my shoulder and elbow. When the pain did 
not subside, I visited my doctor in mid October. I received an MRI in 
November and was referred to Dr Holmstrom at Cottonwood Hospital where 
I was informed surgery was required. 
I had surgery to correct the Rotator Cuff Tear late in December. At this 
point I am still recovering and expect to fully recover towards the end of the 
year. This has been a slow and painful process and I still do not have full 
use of my arm and suffer a lot of pain. I am told this is normal for this type 
of injury. 
Unfortunately, my medical bills to date have been turned into my insurance 
company and I cannot locate the copies at this time so the bills will not be 
available for a while. Also, treatment is not yet complete as I am still in 
Physical Therapy. The amounts listed on the Impact statement are just 
conservative estimates. I also requested a letter from my doctor explaining 
the injury but it has not arrived. 
Later in the evening of the incident, I was again visited by a thief. Someone 
threw a brick through my truck window and stole my laptop out of my truck. 
I cannot prove that this was the work of Mr. Hale but have no reason to 
suspect otherwise at this point. 
I originally did not believe anything was taken from the motor home but 
later discovered that some things were taken and some damage was done. 
It appears that Mr. Hale broke some paneling and tore out an electrical box 
in the vehicle while he was trying to remove a portable TV. I also noticed 
that the remote controls were missing for the TV's. Perhaps he put them in 
his pocket, I don't know. Additionally, a night vision scope was missing 
and a pair of binoculars. 
This accounts for the amounts listed on the Impact statement. 
As far as punishment goes I prefer to leave that to the judgment of the court. 
I am not a vindictive person, but also not a bleeding heart. I have been hurt 
and I am still angry. I do believe in taking responsibility for ones actions. I 
guess my feelings would be to help the young main be productive if the odds 
were for that working out. But if he is one who has spent these several 
months doing nothing and showing no attempt to turn around well put 
him where he can't keep hurting. I think in that case he has already made 
his decision. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Aaron Helbach appeals the trial court's 
denial of his motion to be resentenced. 
This is before the court on the State's 
motion for summary disposition based on 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of 
aggravated robbery in August 2003. 
Helbach completed a statement in support 
of his guilty plea, giving the factual basis 
for his plea and waiving specific rights, 
including his right to appeal. The 
document also specified that he could 
withdraw his plea only on good cause 
shown, and that he must file a motion to 
withdraw his plea before the 
announcement of sentence. Helbach was 
sentenced in September 2003. 
In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion for 
resentencing in the trial court in his 
criminal case. Helbach asserted that he was 
incompetent at the time of his plea, and 
thus the plea was invalid. The trial court 
denied the motion on its merits, finding 
there was no indication that Helbach was 
not fully capable of entering a knowing 
and voluntary plea, and that the mental 
evaluation from the State did not indicate 
any disorder that would impact his 
competency. The trial court also noted the 
motion was filed several months after 
sentencing, but did "not address [the] 
timeliness of the Motion." 
Helbach asserts that his motion was filed 
"under the philosophy" of State v. Rees, 
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2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d 120, cert, granted, 
73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), which permitted 
a defendant to file a motion for 
resentencing in the sentencing court under 
particular circumstances. Helbach has 
apparently seized on Rees to avoid going 
through the procedures for post-conviction 
relief as set forth in the Utah 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah 
Code sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), 
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. 
However, after Rees, this court has held 
that requests to be resentenced to permit a 
renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall 
squarely within rule 65C and the Act. See 
State v. Manning, 2004 UT App 87,1 21, 
89 P.3d 196, cert, granted, 2004 Utah 
LEXIS 172(Utah Aug. 11, 2004). 
Additionally, Helbach has not shown that 
he comes within the scope of Rees. In Rees, 
this court held that extraordinary relief 
may be available in the sentencing court if 
a defendant has been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees, 
2003 UT App 4 at f 6. Such relief, 
however, is available only in "limited 
circumstances, to modify or vacate a 
judgment where extra-record facts show 
that the defendant has been deprived of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial or 
meaningful appeal." Id. at 1 13. Helbach 
waived his right to a trial and appeal by 
pleading guilty and does not come within 
the narrow scope of Rees. 
Instead, Helbach's motion is governed by 
Utah Code section 77-13-6, providing for 
the methods of challenging a guilty plea. 
Section 77-13-6 provides that a guilty plea 
"may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). A 
request to withdraw a plea "shall be made 
by motion before sentence is announced." 
Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant does not 
timely request to withdraw his plea, any 
challenge to the plea must be made 
pursuant to rule 65C and the Act. See id. § 
77-13-6(2)(c). 
*2 Helbach's motion requested 
resentencing, but attacked the validity of 
his plea, arguing he was incompetent. The 
trial court addressed the merits, finding 
that Helbach was not incompetent at his 
plea. The trial court also noted, but did not 
rule on, the late filing of the motion. In 
substance, Helbach's motion was a motion 
to withdraw his plea, and the trial court 
considered it as such. However, under 
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the motion because 
it was made months after sentence was 
announced. Section 77-13-6 limits a 
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea 
to the time before the announcement of 
sentence. See id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). 
"Thereafter, the right is extinguished." 
State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 
1993) (holding that failure to file a timely 
motion for withdrawal extinguishes the 
right). The timely filing of a notice to 
withdraw a plea is jurisdictional. See State 
v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,If 3-4, 40 P .3d 
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630. 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
Helbach's motion, and thus this court 
likewise lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. 
See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 
678-79 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, 
this appeal is dismissed. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2404373 
(Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Westlaw Attached Printing Summary Report for KLUCZNIK,KAREN 2321856 
Date/Time of Request: Monday, May 22, 2006 08:25:00 Mountain 
Client Identifier: HALE 
Database: KEYCITE-HIST 





The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by 
contract with Thomson, West and their affiliates. 
VfetJaw 
Date of Printing: MAY 22,2006 
KEYCITE 




=> 1 State v. Helbach, 2004 WL 2404373, 2004 UT App 388 (Utah App. Oct 28, 
2004) (NO. 20040671-CA) 
Certiorari Denied by 
H 2 State v. Helbach, 109 P.3d 804 (Utah Feb 10, 2005) (TABLE, NO. 20041051) 
© Copyright 2006 West, Carswell, Sweet & Maxwell Asia and Thomson Legal & Regulatory Limited, A 
058 914 668, or their Licensors. All rights reserved. 
